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Mor e Tha n a Passi ng Fad
G. Philip Hughes

em em ber the Sum m it
o f the Americas? A
year ago, President
C linton and the presi
dents and prim e m in
isters o f 33 o th er
nations from the W estern
H em isphere g ath ered in Miami for
a m eeting whose goal, President
Clinton said, was “to create a whole
new architecture for the relation
ship between the nations and the
peoples o f the Am ericas>to ensure
th at dichos becom e hechos, that
words are tu rn e d into deeds.”
T he Miami Sum m it was in ten d ed
to be - and was - different from
the previous m eetings o f W estern
H em isphere leaders in 1956 and
1967. For one thing, all the leaders
atten d in g were dem ocratically
elected; a fact which underscored
C uba’s isolation as the last rem ain
ing dictatorship in Latin America.
For another, leaders from the m ore
recently in d ep en d e n t nations o f
the C aribbean were included.
Perhaps the two m ost im portant
differences from the past sum m its
were these: T he Sum m it leaders
reach ed consensus on negotiating a
Free Trade Area o f the Americas by
2005 and they agreed that this
Sum m it - unlike its predecessors would n o t e n d with pious declara
tions but with a disciplined followup program o f action.
T he goal o f a Free Trade Area of
the Americas, ad o p ted ju st a year
after the ratification o f NAFTA
accord with Mexico and Canada,
was sweeping, am bitious and vision-

Ambassador G. Philip Hughes is
managing director of the Council
of the Americas
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ary. Its adoption reflected the pro
found transform ation th at had
occurred in U.S.-Latin Am erican
relations over last decade. By con
trast, the last time the W estern
H em isp h ere’s leaders m et - at
P unta del Este, L ruguay in 1967 the U.S. was pointedly left out of
the Latin A m erican C om m on
M arket which the leaders plan n ed
to com plete by 1980.
A year has now passed since the
ringing declarations and bright
prom ise o f the Miami Summit. I t’s
time to take stock o f what has been
achieved and what rem ains to be
done to reach the goals o u r leaders
set.
At one level, the “Sum m it followup process” - as it is bureaucratical
ly d ubbed - is a great process.
Perhaps typical o f governm ent p ro 
grams, the process is doing well
what governm ents do best: a myri
ad o f working groups, symposia,
im plem entation review groups,
m inisterial m eetings an d such dis
cussing, reviewing, recom m ending,
drafting, revising, resubm itting and
so forth on recom m ended actions
for each o f the S um m it’s 23 - count
them , 23 - m ain goals.
O f course, not all Sum m it goals
are created equal. Some have
received and probably are destined
to receive scant attention, while the
goal o f hem ispheric trade liberal
ization - the very centerpiece of
the Sum m it - has been the focus of
very deliberate work. In this sense,
the “Sum m it process” is working.
Indeed, policy wonks and trade
gurus in bo th the private and pub
lic sector can take satisfaction in
the fact that a m eeting o f the hem i
sp h ere’s trade m inisters in Denver
last Ju n e set up seven (of 11

planned) working groups to chart
the course o f building a hem ispher
ic free trade area. Moreover, they
can also look with satisfaction on
the fact that these working groups
will all have m et at least twice
before the trade m inisters m eeting
held in Colom bia in March.
As sheer process, then, this is
w onderful - and at one level- nec
essary “stuff.” But in the year since
P resident C linton claim ed his polit
ical and foreign policy victory at
the Miami Summit, w hat substan
tively has been accom plished to
advance the goal o f a Free Trade
A rea o f the Americas? N ot th at
m uch.
While the C linton A dm inistration
never spelled out its long-range
gam e plan or strategy for reaching
the hem ispheric Free T rade Area
goal, it had one straightforw ard
and m odest goal after the adoption
of NAFTA: to reach an ag reem ent
to bring Chile into NAFTA in 1995.
No one disputes the fact th at
C hile’s econom ic reform s m ake it
the m ost qualified Latin Am erican
candidate to jo in NAFTA. With
econom ic growth rates averaging
m ore th at 6 p ercen t from 1990 to
1994, the Chileans have vanquished
inflation, m aintained stable cu rren 
cy, thoroughly privatized stateowned enterprises, and b ro u g h t
about a n u m b er o f necessary market-opening reform s. Because of
these advances - an d with very few
econom ic sectors directly com peti
tive with dom estic U.S. industries many th o u g h t th at Chile h ad a bet
ter case for NAFTA m em bership
than Mexico. Indeed, many policy
m akers today believe th at C hile’s
m em bership in NAFTA would be a
fitting valediction for its successful
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A look a t the Summit of the Americas one year later

transition from the P inochet dicta
torship to democracy.
But where do we stand in taking
this next, historic step toward build
ing a free trade com m unity am ong
o u r neighbors in this hem isphere?
U nfortunately, ab out the same
place as a year ago. It seems that in
the m onths since the Sum m it of
the Americas, interest group poli
tics and presidential electioneering
have delayed, if n o t derailed, the
Free T rade Area o f the Americas
agenda. And b o th the Congress
an d the p resid en t are at fault.
T he C linton A dm inistration, in
seeking congressional approval for
“fast track" negotiating authority,
has insisted th at it be em pow ered
to include agreem ents on the labor
and environm ental standards backed up by the possibility of
trade sanctions - in any agreem ent
on which Congress would then
have only a yes o r no vote. While
on C apitol Hill, the R epublican
m ajority in Congress has been
unwilling to fu rth e r solidify the
p reced en t th at trade agreem ents
should be vehicles for im posing
U.S. social agendas on o th er friend
ly, dem ocratic nations. Like the
earlier debate over NAFTA, the
Congress and the president are
once again locked in debate over
w h ether social issues should take
preced en ce in econom ic negotia
tions.
To date, despite several honest
bro k er attem pts to craft a com pro
mise, the impasse on this issue
seems com plete. And as the U.S.
en ters a presidential election year,
this situation may suit everyone’s
political interests ju st fine.
For the C linton adm inistration,
insisting on a linkage between

future trade agreem ents with Chile
- or any o th er country - and sanc
tions on labor and environm ental
standards, pleases its core labor and
environm ental constituencies. And
if the adm inistration’s insistence on
these conditions held u p any agree
m ent during the election year,
these same constituencies probably
w ouldn’t m ind; alm ost by defini
tion, they are n o t big advocates o f
open m arkets an d free trade.
The Republicans too have little to
lose if the trade agreem ent with
Chile should fall by the wayside.
Failing to reach agreem ent with the
C linton adm inistration on new
trade negotiating authority could
keep the divisive issue o f trade lib
eralization - which pits protection
ist-populist conservatives against
free m arket econom ic conservatives
- off the cam paign trail. Moreover,
it would deny P resident C linton a
trade victory in an election year.
Perhaps this is the reason why
majority leader an d presidential
candidate Bob Dole has had a
change o f h ea rt backing the Free
T rade for the Americas initiative.
As Senator Dole - who earlier
worked h ard to ro u n d up votes for
NAFTA and for the U ruguay
R ound GATT agreem ent - recently
declared on the Senate floor, “We
n eed to step back from this
u n p re ced e n te d whirlwind o f new
trade agreem ents” ... an d “focus on
o u r dom estic house, on the actions
we can take h ere at hom e th at will
im prove o u r global com petitive
ness.”
O f course, political am bition on
bo th ends o f Pennsylvania Avenue
is no t the only reason for the stale
m ate on the building o f a H em i
spheric free trade zone. In the

wake o f M exico’s peso crisis, it is
u nderstandable that last year’s
unbridled enthusiasm for free trade
expansion in the Americas should
be considerably tem pered. No one
can watch the currency o f one of
o u r largest trading p artn ers plum 
m et over 60 percen t in value in a
year w ithout being sobered.
In this clim ate, it’s easy to lose
sight o f the fact that n o n e o f this
has anything to do with NAFTA.
T he peso crisis was the result of
p o o r m anagem ent by the M exican
governm ent o f its spending and
in ternational borrow ing. It could
have h ap p e n ed with or w ithout
NAFTA, with sim ilar results.
Having NAFTA in place is proba
bly helping both the U.S. and
Mexico w eather the peso crisis
m ore effectively. O n the M exican
side, it has locked Mexico into a
correct strategy o f growing o u t of
its econom ic crisis, ra th e r th an clos
ing its econom y to im ports and
trade as it did during its financial
crisis o f the early 1980s. For the
U.S., having NAFTA in place has
helped preserve U.S. exports to
Mexico. Even in th e m idst of
M exico’s worst m o d ern econom ic
crisis, U.S. exports to Mexico
rem ain above pre-NAFTA levels.
Overall, given the peso crisis and
the presidential posturing, it is easy
to lose sight o f what is at stake for
the U.S. in the effort to build a
Free Trade A rea o f the Americas.
Simply put, the following is at
stake: in a region th at for g en era
tions has regarded the U.S. and its
business and econom ic interests
with fear an d suspicion, that has
periodically nationalized, taxed,
restricted or otherw ise tried to limit
U.S. business p en etratio n o f many
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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o f its m arkets, the opportunity for
a real, en d u rin g o pening is at
hand.
T h ro u g h o u t Latin Am erica, coun
tries th at once pursued closed eco
nom ic systems are tu rn in g away
from th eir old m odels and em brac
ing policies o f privatization and
openness to foreign investm ent and
trade. In fact, as free trade has
been found to b ring in its wake
lower prices, jo b creation, greater
consum er satisfaction, innovation
and growth, o u r southern neigh
bors are actively liberalizing their
trading arran g em en t with each
other. MERCOSUR, a custom s
u n io n o f A rgentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay, is presently
negotiating with Chile, Bolivia, and
even the E uropean U nion to liber
alize m arket access.
Thus, o u r E uropean com petitors
could easily attain free m arket
access to the en tire South
A m erican m arket before the U.S.
an d its NAFTA partners. We simply
can n o t afford to be left behind; the
cost to o u r econom y w ould be
trem endous. As the late
C om m erce Secretary Ron Brown
said last June in Denver, “We know
th at free trade brings greater pros
perity. T he U.S. alone stands to
create 2 m illion m ore jo b s as Latin
A m erica incom es continue to climb
an d U.S. exports increase over the
n ex t eight years.”
With th e stalem ate o f progress on
free trade negotiations with Chile,
the m o m entum o f the Miami
Sum m it o f the Americas is being
lost. W ith it we risk losing the his
toric o pportunity to replace generations-old suspicions ab o u t U.S. busi
ness interests in Latin Am erica with
a clim ate o f openness and p a rtn e r
ship. Equally im portant, we risk los
ing the resulting econom ic growth
potential for all the societies o f the
hem isphere.
O u r leaders in the Congress and
the W hite H ouse should no t let this
op p o rtu n ity fall by the wayside. ■
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A Mat t er of Deconstruction
Jean Grugel and Anthony Payne

he concept o f “Latin
America and the
C aribbean” (LAC) is
dead; long live a vision
o f “the Am ericas” with
many different com po
n e n t parts. T h at is to dramatize,
but no t to distort, the conclusion to
which we have been inexorably
drawn as a result of research u n d er
taken at the University o f Sheffield
in England over the last two years.
We have been working as p art o f a
team investigating the em ergence of
a nu m b er o f regionalist projects in
the contem porary world o rd er and
have focused o u r attention on the
im plications for the LAC countries
o f the recen t and im portant U.S.
tu rn toward a form o f regionalism
in its own hem isphere. This shift of
U.S. policy impacts the econom ic
shape o f the LAC region. O ur full
conclusions are set forth in our
respective chapters in Andrew
Gamble and A nthony Payne (eds),
Regionalism and World Order, pub
lished by St. M artin’s Press in New
York in M arch 1996. W hat follows
here is the broad outline of the
argum ent we make.
T he necessary starting point is a
sense o f the variations in the rela
tively long history o f U.S. relations
with the rest o f the Americas. The
key p o in t is th at the politics o f the
recen t past (defined as the Cold
War period) have been distinctive,
n o t typical. They were character-

Jean Grugel is lecturer in politics and
Anthony Payne is professor of politics
at the University of Sheffield in
England. They have recently collabo
rated on a study of regional blocforviation in the Americas.
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ized by the way in which the U.S.
perceived itself as a hegem onic
power and associated its credibility
in the eyes o f both its enem ies and
allies in all parts o f the world with
its capacity to m aintain and dem on
strate control o f its own hem ispher
ic com m unity - its “backyard.”

The control of drug
trafficking is not made
easier by the freeing
of markets; and
environmentalism
challenges many of the
favored prescriptions of
the Washington-driven
neoliberal economic
consensus.

Viewed historically, however, this
period constitutes one o f several dif
ferent phases which can be detected
in the unfolding o f U.S. policy with
in the Americas. Broadly, these
reflect a progression in the U.S.
position from national consolida
tion in the 19th century; to the
assertion o f regional power status in
the Caribbean and C entral America
in the first 30 years o f this century;
to a tentative wider em brace of
(unequal) partnership with Latin
America from the mid-1930s to the
mid-1940s; to the acquisition after
1945 o f a globally hegem onic posi
tion with all its attendant symbolic
ramifications for the whole o f the
hem isphere; and finally to the ulti
mately unsuccessful reassertion of

that hegem ony u n d er Reagan in the
1980s. From such a perspective, the
Cold War years stand n o t as an
exem plar or a norm , b u t merely as
an episode.
Moreover, this era was novel in
the longer history o f U.S. relations
within the Americas in th at the
imperatives o f global hegem ony
required the U.S. to have a strategic
concern for all developm ents in all
parts of the hem isphere. Nowhere
was too small, no incident too
insignificant, to draw a U.S.
response, provided that it could be
connected to the global agenda.
For the first time, therefore, U.S.
foreign policy treated the whole
region as if it was a co h eren t unit.
In o ther words, it was the U.S. - not
the regional states themselves which created our contem porary
understanding o f “Latin America
and the C aribbean” as a region. It
did so for reasons o f national advan
tage in the very specific context of
the Cold War. Q uite obviously, it
did no t develop the concept in
o rd er to facilitate the integration or
liberation o f LAC. Indeed, the con
sequence for the countries o f LAC
was an enforced prioritization of
their relations with W ashington and
the establishm ent o f very tight
boundaries within which they could
pursue their own developm ental
goals. T he Cold War years are of
obvious im portance and n o t only
because they are the im m ediate
backdrop to the present. But now
that they have passed, new consider
ations bear upon the m aking of U.S.
policy for its own hem isphere. In
o rder to understand what these pre
sent trends are, we need to think in
a m ore fluid way than the LAC con
cept allows.
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Rethinking the labels of “Latin America and the Caribbean ”

T here certainly cannot be any
do u b t that the U.S. has been partic
ularly active in relating to LAC
states in a variety o f policy areas
since the beginning o f the 1990s,
and th at relations between the U.S.
and the rest o f the Americas are
closer now than for many years. As
the Miami Sum m it o f the Americas
showed, the d om inant political dis
course in the region is currently
characterized by notions o f “part
nership, synergy and cooperation.”
Old Cold War concepts like “threat,
war and subversion” have been de
em phasized. It is also necessary to
concede that the Bush adm inistra
tion, so often derided for its lack of
vision, developed a distinctive view
o f the way it w anted LAC to develop
over the final years o f this century.
In that sense, the Enterprise for the
Americas bids can be seen as a gen
uinely historic speech which picked
up existing trends and assembled
them into a new agenda for the
Americas. In m ore theoretical
terms, it can be said to represent
the initiation o f a U.S. project to
offset the loss o f global hegem ony
(which, as already indicated, the
Reagan adm inistration had unsuc
cessfully tried to reclaim) by the
establishm ent o f a regional hegem o
ny in the Americas across economic,
security and ideological agendas.
To begin with, the Clinton adm in
istration was slow to see the implica
tions and benefits o f such a project,
b u t it eventually caught up and has
now etched o u t a policy framework
for the Americas which links free
trade, dem ocracy and security in a
m ore direct fashion than Bush ever
managed. In short, Bush and
C linton have been able to advance
quite significantly the regional pro

je c t set out in the Enterprise for the
Americas. Nevertheless, our
research suggests that they have not
fully succeeded in engineering a
U.S. regional hegem ony across the
Americas. In fact, there are good
reasons for believing that som ething
o f a high tide may have already have
been reached and that the trend of
U.S. policy over the rem aining years
of the decade may accordingly be
one of retreat and growing difficul
ty. T hree reasons stand ou t in our
argum ent, two o f which will be
briefly highlighted and one
explored in slightly greater depth
since it relates directly to the disin
tegration o f the concept o f LAC.

The U.S. remains the hub of
the new Americas, but it has
not created and almost
certainly does not need to
create an even regional
hegemony across all parts
of the hemisphere.

First, there are real contradictions
between the contem porary econom 
ic and security agendas developed
by the U.S. for the Americas. Put
starkly, econom ic liberalization and
dem ocratization, which appear as
com plem entary from W ashington’s
perspective, are in fact far from
com fortable bedfellows. Notwith
standing the rhetoric to the con
trary, the control o f drug trafficking
is no t m ade easier by the freeing of
m arkets; and environm entalism , if
taken seriously, challenges many of

the favored prescriptions o f the
W ashington-driven neoliberal eco
nom ic consensus.
Second, the U.S. Americas project
is no t grounded domestically on a
firm social and political base. The
fact is that the regionalist option has
been deployed in U.S. politics by a
variety o f groups for different, often
mutually exclusive, reasons and the
many contradictions that this has
entailed have not been worked
through, let alone resolved. The
coalitions that passed NAFTA or
supported the invasion o f Haiti
were, at best, fragile. At worst, as
the debate about Proposition 187 in
C alifornia shows, the policy issues of
the Americas have the capacity to
penetrate and divide U.S. society
and politics in a very harm ful fash
ion. Either way, the increasingly
fragm ented nature o f the U.S.
state/society com plex in the mid1990s does no t augur well for the
fu rth er and full developm ent o f the
wider enterprise for the Americas
initially set out by Bush.
Third, it had becom e ap p aren t
during the course o f the last few
years that the U.S. is n o t equally
concerned with all parts o f the
Americas. It does no t have to take
a view o f LAC as a whole - some
thing which it felt necessary to do
by way o f exam ple in the era of
global hegem ony - and it accord
ingly draws increasingly im portant
distinctions between its policies
toward different parts o f the form er
LAC region.
This is the facet o f o ur research
that we want to stress and explore a
little fu rth er in the rem ainder of
this article. For what has em erged
in the last few years is a reordering
o f U.S. involvement based on the
Hemisphere
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evolution o f two new “m aps” and
the form er does n o t relate easily or
neatly to the latter. W ashington in
effect now has only fragm ented
dem ands to make upon LAC states:
the need to resolve im m igration
problem s with others and the neces
sity to control drugs flows from and
through still others. Put another
way, there are bo th winners and
losers within the old LAC as a con
sequence o f the new regionalist
policies of the U.S., and it is an
im portant p art o f developing a
m ore n uanced understanding of
relations within the Americas that
this is fully grasped.
The new econom ic m ap favors
Mexico in the m ost obvious way.
N ot only is it a m em ber o f NAFTA,
b u t th at m em bership enables it to
play a key role in the im plem enta
tion o r obstruction o f any future
plans to extend hem ispheric free
trade. O th er potential beneficiaries
include Chile, which was prom ised
free trade talks before anybody else
as a reward for its early program of
liberalization and has lately been
given a target date for NAFTA acces
sion o f Jan u ary 1, 1997. T hrough
their m em bership in the G roup of
T hree with Mexico, both Venezuela
and Colom bia also edge closer by
proxy to the U.S. m arket and
toward a U.S. seal o f approval. By
contrast, o th er m em bers o f the
A ndean Pact, such as P eru and
Bolivia, have been left to plum m et
into recession and would struggle to
com pete within a putative hem i
spheric free trade bloc. Caribbean
and Central Am erican countries are
severely dam aged, at least relatively,
by the advent of NAFTA and have
resorted to m aking a case for parity
with Mexican term s o f entry into
the U.S. m arket, a strategy that can
only succeed if they can find some
way o f regaining their form er Cold
War priority in W ashington. The
only potential challenge to this U.S.drawn m ap is to be found within the
MERCOSUR countries. Brazil has
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two

flirted with the idea o f trying to
build an alternative subregional
bloc organized around a South
Am erican Free Trade Area
(SAFTA), bu t the latest signs are
that it is already backing away from
this prospect.
The new security m ap of the
Americas is rath er different, but
equally uneven. T he issues which
the U.S. currently defines as central
to its security - im m igration, the
environm ent and drugs - require
the design o f policies to be applied
above all on the periphery o f the
new political economy, nam ely the
Caribbean, C entral Am erica and the
depressed A ndean countries of
Bolivia and Peru. In security terms,
the S outhern Cone countries are a
long way from the U.S. m ainland and there is no do u b t that in the
post-Cold War age, the signal of
concern weakens the fu rth er it
moves away from U.S. territory.
Only in Mexico, in fact, does the

U.S. recognize the need to respond
with an integrated set of policies
from trade and investm ent to immi
gration and drugs.
In sum, LAC, as we have known it
for 30 to 40 years, has been com pre
hensively “deconstructed.” T he new
Americas is com posed o f different
subregions, each with a different
econom ic and security agenda and
each with different relations with
the U.S. The U.S. rem ains the hub
o f the new Americas, but it has n o t
created and almost certainly does
n o t need to create an even regional
hegem ony across all parts of the
hem isphere. As for observers o f the
Americas, we have no choice but to
follow the logic of the trends
described here. This m eans th at we
m ust focus the best p art of o ur
future investigative and analytical
efforts upon a p ro p e r disaggrega
tion of the different parts o f what
we once thought o f simply as “Latin
America and the C aribbean.” ■
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And Justice For All?
B rad Bullock

entral American politics
tend to generate a
healthy skepticism about
the significance o f elec
tions. G uatem ala’s histo
ry certainly inspires little
optimism. Yet, these elections
prom ised to be different from those
of Guatem ala’s past, and there were
reasons for some excitem ent about
their potential significance for
Guatem ala’s future. As it turned
out, were they significant?
Speculation is dangerous business,
and it may be too early to speculate
about the eventual ramifications of
the electoral results. But the event
itself held hopeful signs that
Guatemala is moving toward con
structive change, and maybe even a
lasting peace.
Guatemala is a country in urgent
need of change and o f peace. It is
one the poorest nations in Latin
America. Inequality is staggering around 4 of every 5 Guatemalans live
below the poverty line. At least 27
percent of the population is landless,
while around 2 percent of the
landowners control 65 percent of the
land. Although indigenous people
comprise m ore than 60 percent of
G uatem ala’s 11 million citizens, their
basic needs and rights have been
ignored or denied for centuries; over
1 million are internally displaced
from their land and a half million
m ore have fled to refugee camps
across the Mexican border.
G uatem ala’s social indicators are
all near the bottom for Latin
America: nearly half the population
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is illiterate; infant mortality stands at
about 60 deaths per 1,000 live births
(com pared to about 9 for the U.S.);
two-fifths of its people (mostly chil
dren) suffer from m alnutrition. It is
at the top of the rankings, however,
for hum an rights violations: in 1995,
through July alone, there were over
10,200 reported cases. Its people are
now driven down by m ore than three
decades of exceptional corruption,
inefficiency, oppression, and bloody
civil conflict (over 150,000 deaths
and another 50,000 “disappeared,”
mostly indigenous people at the
hands of the military or paramilitary
death squads). These realities, and
fear, characterize Guatemalan life.

Powerful international
forces are making new
demands of the Guatemalan
leadership while growing
national forces are
challenging the status
quo from within.
Now change appears im m inent.
Powerful international forces are
making new dem ands o f the
Guatemalan leadership while grow
ing national forces are challenging
the status quo from within. Stark
realities and an atm osphere ripe for
change - within this context we may
best understand the complexities of
G uatem ala’s 1995 elections and what
m ade them unique.
P r e -e l e c t i o n C o n t e x t

O ne difference was the sense that
there was finally a window through

which Guatemalans m ight expect
fair and m ore representative elec
tions. Peace negotiations with
URNG insurgents m ade headway on
im portant issues and produced
promises for further agreements.
The Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca (URNG) agreed to a
cease-fire during the election period.
The U.N. mission to verify the
Guatemalan H um an Rights Accords
was in place, including a revision of
the legal system and other measures
enacted to challenge the traditional
atm osphere of military impunity.
Never before had so many interna
tional observers been invited by the
governm ent to witness the elections.
A nother difference was the greater
num ber o f groups invested in this
event by com parison to past elec
tions (in contrast, say, to those held
in 1990). Guatemala is in an area of
the world where elections are typical
ly ignored by the North, but the
international com m unity expressed
notable interest in these elections.
Why so m uch interest and why, espe
cially, U.S. interest? Preceding the
elections, the causes of Rigoberta
M enchu and Jennifer H arbury drew
attention to Guatemala and pro
duced international pressure on gov
ernm ent officials to speed up the
peace process. More representative
elections and a peaceful transition of
power, in this context, became a test
of Guatem ala’s com m itm ent to
peace.
Rigoberta M enchu, an indigenous
Guatemalan and form er exile,
received a 1992 Nobel Peace Prize
for her work publicizing the horrors
o f the civil war and the long struggle
of h er people to secure land and
basic hum an rights. As an interna
tional figure, M enchu m onitored
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pre-election events and drew atten
tion to continuing acts of violence or
intim idation that could compromise
the integrity o f the peace process or
the elections. A good example is her
public denouncem ent of the military
slaying o f 13 indigenous people in
Copan. M enchu’s public statements
about the alleged kidnapping of her
nephew, ju st days before the elec
tion, also brought considerable inter
national attention and put the
G uatem alan state on the defensive.
The kidnaping tu rned out to be an
extortion plot by h er relatives.
As with Ms. M enchu’s public
denouncem ents, the ongoing
H arbury case has kept the world
focused on extra-judicial acts o f vio
lence by the Guatemalan military.
O n a grander scale, it has dam aged
the credibility o f the U.S. role as
global peace-maker and has m ade
U.S. statem ents about pushing
G uatem ala’s “race for peace” sound
ingenuous. The end o f the Cold
War and the lack o f a credible “com
m unist th reat” in the area has fos
tered increasing intolerance for U.S.
m anipulations of regional politics.
New U.S. policy officially em pha
sizes defending hum an rights, resolv
ing prolonged conflicts, and restor
ing just, representative democracies
in place of autocratic military
regimes. The sincerity o f these poli
cies was bolstered by highly public
U.S. operations in Haiti, bu t it was
tarnished by the series o f em barrass
ing pre-election revelations tying the
CIA to Guatemalan military officials
involved in a num ber o f killings or
disappearances. For example,
Colonel Julio Alpirez was already an
“asset” on the CIA payroll in 1990
when he ordered the brutal slaying
of U.S. citizen Michael Devine (just

m onths after Alpirez graduated from
the U.S. School o f the Americas in
Ft. Benning, GA.). He is the same
officer responsible for the extrajudi
cial execution of H arbury’s husband,
Efrain Bamaca, in 1992. Such inci
dents doubtlessly influenced the
replacem ent o f ousted president
Serrano, in 1993, with Ramiro de
Leon Carpio, form er om budsm an of
hum an rights.
Military acts of im punity have con
tinued. Alpirez “escaped” the same
night he was jailed and rem ains at
large. H ere again were revelations
that jeopardized both the tenuous
peace process and the elections, and
for once the world was watching.
Both governments were left with
m ore reasons than ever to ensure
the success o f the elections, and
although the U.S. issued official
statem ents from a neutral position, it
is likely that a stronger message to
Guatemalan (and CIA) officials was
delivered behind the scenes.
These elections included earnest
participation by the left for the first
time since the 1954 coup. A leftist
coalition of parties called the New
Guatemala Democratic Front
(FDNG) wisely chose Jorge Gonzalez
del Valle as its candidate for presi
d ent and Mayan leader Juan Leon
Alvarado for vice president. Mr.
Gonzalez carries impressive creden
tials: economics studies at Yale and
Columbia, form er president o f the
Bank o f Guatemala, two stints as
Latin American director o f the IMF,
and executive positions with several
m ultinational financial institutions.
In a private m eeting he explained
that the FDNG provided voters with
a viable alternative to conservative
parties, an alternative that would
include the interests of unions,

women, Mayan groups, and hum an
rights organizations. As a new move
m ent, the FDNG focused on making
inroads at the local and state levels.
In many cases, they supported inde
pendent civic committees running
indigenous candidates for mayor
rather than ru n their own candi
dates.
Ironically, the political participa
tion o f the left was precipitated by
the rise of the Guatemalan
Republican Front (FRG), an extrem e
right-wing party led by Efrain Rios
Montt. During his short reign from
1982-83, Rios M ontt’s infamous
“scorched ea rth ” counterinsurgency
policies left over 15,000 dead. A dis
mal 17 percent of registered voters
turned out for the special 1994 con
gressional elections, due partly to a
URNG boycott; the FRG won 32 out
of 80 seats and Rios M ontt was m ade
president o f the Congress. Rios
M ontt’s announcem ent that he
would ru n for president as the FRG
candidate sent a wake-up call to the
left. Although Rios M ontt and then
his wife were eventually ruled ineligi
ble to ru n for president, it was still
Rios M ontt’s party. FRG campaign
posters showed Rios M ontt in the
center, between candidates Alfonso
Portillo and Carlos Anibal Mendez,
his arms around their shoulders. In
fact, the party’s own slogan was,
“Portillo to the presidency, Rios
Montt to power.”
Indigenous groups were also
invested in these elections. O ne rea
son was the participation of the
FDNG. The URNG broke precedent
and did not call on citizens to boy
cott the elections. A nother factor
was the newly established Rigoberta
M enchu Foundation, an agency for
advancing the causes o f indigenous
Hemisphere * Volume Seven, Number Two
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G uatem alans. T he F o u n d atio n ’s
first m ajor pro ject was to m obilize
th e indigenous vote; it directed
cam paigns to register indigenous
p eo p le in ru ral areas an d spon
sored local w orkshops to educate
largely illiterate campesinos about
th e electoral process.
P am phlets an d posters were dis
trib u ted in Mayan dialects ra th e r
th an Spanish, an d M enchu m ade
several public ap p earances endors
ing th e 1995 elections as a tool for
voicing indigenous issues. Careful
to rem ain n o n p artisan, she spoke
at a final rally m arking the official
close o f th e cam paign period; the
speech en co u rag ed h e r people to
overcom e th eir apathy o r fears and
vote for whom would best re p re
sent them . A nd, for once, there
were som e ind ig en ous candidates
on the ballot. In d igenous citizens
exercised th eir rig h t to form inde
p e n d e n t civic com m ittees an d ran
th eir own candidates at the local
m ayoral level, m arking a new
ep och in G uatem alan elections.
G u atem ala’s traditional pow er
base did n o t p resen t a unified
front. T h e m ilitary an d the eco
nom ic elite d em o n strated divided
loyalties th at co n trib u ted to som e
uneasy alliances. T hose focused
on preserving th e national status
quo lean ed tow ard parties on the
far right, such as Rios M o n tt’s
FRG. This in clu d ed m ilitary h a rd 
liners, who fo u n d no reason to
accom m odate th e URNG, an d the
CACIF, a pow erful g roup re p re 
senting th e private sector. M ilitary
institutionalistas, m ore o p en to
n eg o tiated peace an d a revised
role for th e army, an d a rising
g ro u p o f in tern a tio n al financiers
su p p o rted parties n o t so far to the
right, particularly the new Party o f
N ational A dvancem ent (PAN).
R epresenting th e “m odernizing
rig h t,” the PAN’s p residential can
didate, Alvaro Arzu, ro d e this sup
p o rt to a lead in th e pre-election
polls.
12 Hemisphere
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In the en d , th ere were 19 presi
dential candidates representing 23
parties. Yet am id signs that new
forces were shaping an event akin to
real dem ocratic elections,
G uatem ala’s electoral process still
serves to protect the power o f the
Ladino m inority through what may
be called structural fraud. Balloting
is done by h an d from com puter
generated sheets containing the
nam es of everyone who has voted in
the last several elections. Only the
final stages o f vote counting are
done electronically. Many o f the
dead and missing have no t been
purged from the rolls, yet this does
no t always stop them from casting
votes, as Guatem alans will wryly tell
you.

Many of the dead and
missing have not been
purged from the rolls,
yet this does not always
stop them from casting
votes, as Guatemalans
will wryly tell you.

New registrants and all voters
m ust present a cedula, o r national
identity card, and replacing a cedula
requires birth docum ents and some
courage. Over decades o f civil war,
hundreds o f rural villages were
utterly destroyed and hundreds of
thousands o f indigenous people
were internally-displaced or becam e
refugees; cedulas and o th er records
have been burned, confiscated, or
lost in flight. C hildren b o rn in
flight o r in hiding are now com ing
o f age to register but have no offi
cial papers.
Voters are also required to return
to their birthplace, or where their
cedula was issued, to cast their bal
lots. T he tim e and expense to trav

el, sometimes great distances, and
the lost hours of work are the h ard
est on the rural, and largely indige
nous, poor. Finally, due to com 
plaints about m anipulations and
“anom alies” in the 1991 decennial
census, political representation is
still based on the census from 1981.
Given the high birth rates in indige
nous districts, one can understand
why a Ladino governm ent m ight
favor such a m ethod.
O ther types o f structural fraud
seem m ore endem ic to these partic
ular elections. The ballots were 8.5
inch by 11 inch sheets covered with
colorful party symbols. Since virtu
ally every local, state, and national
position in the country was up for
grabs, a typically illiterate voter
received five separate color-coded
ballots that had to be properly
m arked, folded, and re tu rn ed to
corresponding table slots. T he pres
idential ballot alone presented 10
symbols, coincidentally arranged so
that those o f the PAN and the FRG
- the two leading parties - held the
p rom inent positions on the page.
T he process was confusing and
lengthy, and thus potentially dis
couraging. After waiting in line,
voters averaged between four and
five m inutes to m ark and stuff the
ballots. This raises an o th er issue:
each voting table was assigned 600
potential voters who had to vote at
that table during the 12 hours polls
were open. Even if voters averaged
only two m inutes to com plete the
entire process, only 360 voters per
table would make it through. The
TSE responded to this observation
by declaring th at anyone still wait
ing in line when the polls closed
would be allowed to vote, b u t it was
no t always the case.
E l e c t io n R e su l t s

As com m only predicted, no presi
dential candidate won a majority,
resulting in a January 7, 1996 ru n 
off between the PAN and the FRG.
The PAN’s Arzu was declared the
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victor with ju st over 51 percent o f
the vote. PAN took 42 out o f 80
congressional seats in the November
elections and now enjoys a solid
majority position from which to
push its neoliberal econom ic agen
da. The FRG won the second
largest nu m b er o f seats in congress,
m aking it the largest m inority party.
Most notable, however, was the
respectable showing by the leftist
FDNG coalition, which was predict
ed to get less than 2 percent of the
vote; instead, it won almost 8 per
cent of the vote and 6 congressional
seats, giving m arginalized groups a
new voice in the national power
structure. T he FDNG also collected
four mayoral victories. These victo
ries, though nom inally small, heart
en an incipient grass-roots move
m ent for change.
People finally want to know
w hether the elections were fair. I
believe that generally they were,
given the limits o f the electoral
process. From my observations,
there was little to suggest that the
local people were engaged in any
thing but an earnest attem pt to
carry o u t their duties with integrity.
With few exceptions, infractions
were minor. T he table volunteers,
many o f whom worked from about 6
a.m. until 11 p.m., received 50Q
each (about $8) from the TSE for
their efforts. T he military basically
stayed away and there was no seri
ous election day violence. The pres
ence o f international teams helped
remove blatant forms o f fraud at
lower levels. Certainly, there were
denouncem ents for fraud and
intim idation at particular polling
places - disturbances included
threats o f force and reports o f bal
lot-stuffing or ballot-burning - but
such incidents were fewer than in
past elections.
Fraud at a higher level cannot be
ru led out. Despite assurances from
the TSE about the results, interna
tionals and representatives from the
several parties continue to express

grave misgivings about the 45m inute, nationwide power outage
that in terru p te d the vote tally (the
official explanation was that a tree
had fallen on a power line!). For
an o th er unsettling bit o f news, the
governm ent actually p rinted a total
on 39 m illion ballots, m ore than
twice the am ount required even if
all 3.6 m illion registered voters
showed up to vote. We never did
get a good explanation for why so
many extra ballots were printed nor
learn what hap p en ed to them . Yet,
the most disturbing aspect o f the
elections rem ains the structural
problem s built into the electoral
process itself. These problem s help
to explain a lighter rural tu rn o u t
for the presidential run-off,
although nobody expected indige
nous citizens to be highly motivated
to for either candidate.
T
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F i n a l A n a l y s is

T he event becam e a symbolic
turn ing point for Guatem ala - a
harbinger of better things. Elections
will have m attered a great deal.
However, in a volatile new world
order, reform s dep en d m ore than
ever on external forces that appear
beyond the control of the govern
m ent or the people. Even if A rzu’s
neoliberal policies or the prom ise of
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an extension o f NAFTA agreem ents
improve econom ic growth, this
alone may only aggravate econom ic
disparities. Selling off public en ter
prises, creating free trade zones,
and m ore maquilas will n o t address
hum an rights violations or landless
ness.
At least the PAN’s narrow presi
dential victory makes progressive
reform s m ore likely. H um an rights
activists were m ortified by Portillo’s
announcem ent that upon his victo
ry, Rios M ontt would be appointed
head o f the new National Security
Commission (giving him m ore
power than the defense m inister).
H ad the FRG won the election and
effectively restored Rios M ontt to
power, it would have represented a
giant step backward for Guatemala.
At best, the result would have m eant
business as usual.
As the new president, A rzu’s effec
tiveness will be challenged by high
crim e and unem ploym ent rates,
chronic poverty, and continuing
concerns over hum an rights viola
tions. H e m ust still work with an
en tren ch ed oligarchy. But his
biggest challenges will be com plet
ing the peace negotiations and
revising the role o f the military still one o f the m ost powerful forces
in Guatemala. ■
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The Economics of Security
Patrice M . Franho

L

atin America has u n d er
gone three profound
changes in its security
environm ent in the late
1980s and the first half
o f the 1990s. T he end
o f the Cold War has transform ed
the international security arena,
realigning actors and objectives. At
the same time, m ost Latin American
nations were undertaking the diffi
cult process o f dem ocratization, fun
dam entally altering the relationship
between civilians and the military in
the public arena. Finally, the pur
suit of political opening was accom
panied by econom ic liberalization.
Given the long experience with
im port substitution industrializa
tion, the move toward a m arket-dri
ven developm ent strategy is a revo
lution in the econom ic paradigm
for the region.
An O

v e r v ie w

Neoliberalism effectively ended
im port-substitution industrialization
(ISI) strategies th at dom inated the
econom ic landscape in the region
from the 1950s through the 1980s.
In contrast to the state-centered
inward looking policies of ISI,
neoliberalism places the interna
tional m arket at the center o f the
developm ent process. T he neoliber
al m odel, dubbed the W ashington
Consensus to reflect the positions of
the IMF, the World Bank and the
U.S. governm ent, encourages price
liberalization, deregulation o f m ar
kets, virtual free trade, unrestricted
capital movements, private sector

Patrice M. Franko is associate professor
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activity and the use o f m onetary pol
icy instrum ents. This is a radical
change from the argum ents as to
international price instability, the
need for state incentives for growth,
the focus on technology acquisition
by the state to com plem ent markets,
and the use o f fiscal policy to pro
m ote growth in the ISI package.
W hat im plications does neoliberal
ism have for security policy in the
region?

Cutting defense expenditures
along with other items in
the budget is not necessarily
a bad thing. The decline in
defense spending in the
region, however, has largely
taken place in a policy
vacuum.
T

he

N

e o l jb e r a l

M

odel

A core assum ption o f neoliberal
ism is the proposition that the pri
vate m arket perform s b etter than
the state in the allocation of
resources. Its im plem entation is
first and forem ost about lim iting
the econom ic choices a state makes
in the developm ent process. It is
no accident th at the rise o f neolib
eralism coincided with the en d of
access to easy money. Even w ithout
the strict conditions of the
International M onetary Fund and
the World Bank, tight resources
forced nations to make tough
choices between com peting ends.
T he neoliberal m odel replaces
active axe chopping on the p art of

the governm ent with the passive
workings o f the market.
Defense, nevertheless, is n o t m ar
ket driven. The quintessential pub
lic good, the responsibility for secu
rity decision m aking falls on the
shoulders o f governm ent - a gov
ern m e n t increasingly constrained in
its ability to pursue a wide range of
options. With fewer resources, the
opportunity costs o f m aking one
choice versus the o th er increase. As
a result, governm ents have cut back
on spending in the defense sector.
Figure 1 shows the sim ultaneous
decline in military spending (Milex)
and central governm ent expendi
ture (CGE) in the region. (Note
the different scales for each as rep
resented by two vertical axes.) In
1983, central governm ent expendi
tures in Latin America were $335.8
billion; military expenditures were
$22.9 billion, approxim ately 6.8 per
cent of every governm ent dollar
spent. After a decade of structural
adjustm ent, in 1993 central govern
m ent expenditures fell to $282.4 bil
lion and military expenditures regis
tered $17.4 billion or 6.2 p ercent of
governm ent spending. In South
America the real growth rate o f mili
tary expenditures was -2.1 percent
over the decade; in C entral America
-19.6 percent. In sharp contrast,
military spending in the developing
world as a whole declined -0.7 per
cent. T he decline o f the arm ed
forces in South America reflected
these cuts in expenditures, decreas
ing -3.2 percent over the period; in
Central America the decrease was
2.7 percent. T he U.S. Arms C ontrol
and Disarm am ent Agency reported
that the average annual force ratio,
or the num bers in the arm ed forces
com pared to the population fell 5
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Security forces face the music

Figure 1: Trends in Central Government Expenditure and Military Spending
Military Spending
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US$ Billion

Central Government Expenditure
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Source: U.S. Arms C ontrol and Disarm am ent Agency, World Military Expenditures 1983-1993

p ercen t in South Am erica and 4.7
p ercen t in C entral America.
Cutting defense expenditures
along with o th er items in the bud
get is n o t necessarily a bad thing.
T he decline in defense spending in
the region, however, has largely
taken place in a policy vacuum. As
cogently argued by Francisco Rojas
Aravena in “Procesos de Decisiones en el
Gasto Militar Latinoamericano ”
(Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, Aho 9,
Vol. IX, No. 3, Julio-Septiem bre
1994), defense policy in Latin
Am erica has n o t responded to the
changes in the internal or external
environm ents. A ppropriations for
defense are u n d ertaken on an his
torical basis, m inus cuts by necessity.
T he overall shape o f governm ent
has changed, but the execution of
defense policy has no t been radical
ly altered. Neoliberalism as accom
panied by dem ocratization requires
a fresh vision o f defense spending
in the region. R ather than policy by

default, scarce resources should be
deployed to m eet clearly defined
objectives that reflect the new inter
national and dom estic realities.
A rearticulation of defense policy
in the new strategic environm ent
m ust responsibly ask the question
w hether additions to defense spend
ing exceed the costs. As every eco
nom ics principles student knows,
efficiency in a m arket is achieved
where the m arginal benefits o f an
action equal the m arginal costs. If
the additional costs o f a particular
objective exceed the addition to
benefits p er dollar spent, the activity
should no t be undertaken.
This hard nosed equation is dri
ven by the assum ption that one can
accurately m easure both costs and
benefits. C onsider the option of
participating in m ultilateral peace
keeping operations. T he addition
to cost is easily estim ated, and if
international agencies cover some
portion of the participants’ salary

and benefits, the direct costs may
indeed appear to be m inimal.
Indirect costs should also be includ
ed; if the military is engaged in m ul
tilateral activities, it is n o t doing
som ething else. For some, ironical
ly, this is a benefit, arguing th at if
the military is engaged in Bosnia or
Haiti, it is not m eddling in politics
at hom e. For others, soldiers sent
abroad to keep the peace in an oth
er nation are resources n o t applied
within dom estic borders.
Benefits are even h ard er to esti
mate. Participation in peacekeep
ing operations brings with it train
ing, especially in term s o f in tero p er
ability with o ther forces. It is
argued that a degree o f profession
alization occurs as Latin militaries
work side by side with NATO sol
diers. Participation in peacekeep
ing may also bring prestige and
favor in the international com m uni
tyAt the risk o f traum atizing those
who hated principles o f m icroeco
nomics, it is useful to think o f this
discussion in graphic terms.
Assume that we can group levels of
participation in peacekeeping oper
ations starting from a m inim al level,
A, over increasing am ounts, ending
in option F. We note that the b ene
fits o f peacekeeping, like any o th er
good facing dim inishing returns,
tend to decrease as we engage in
m ore o f it. A rbitrary num bers have
been assigned to the vertical axes,
showing that initially peacekeeping
brings benefits in term s o f prestige
and training, bu t as m ore peace
keeping is undertaken there are
fewer additional benefits. A rm ed
forces have been trained, the inter
national com m unity has sent its
thanks, and the benefits diminish.
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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Figure 2: Relative Costs and Benefits of Peacekeeping Operations
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Units o f Peacekeeping

Costs increase with increasing levels
of engagem ent. At level E, for
example, we see th at the costs of
peacekeeping far exceed the bene
fits. Activity should be cut back to
the level where the addition to ben
efits ju st equals the cost.
As difficult as these costs and b en 
efits are to estimate, it is imperative
to do so. Decreases in resources
available to the military require
h ard choices in defense policy. In a
dem ocratic society this debate
should take place as an annual,
transparent part o f defense appro
priations.
O ne o f the key difficulties in
applying m arginal analysis is the
problem o f time. M arginal costs
and benefits accrue no t only in the
present b u t also in the future. If
resources are directed toward
hum anitarian assistance, the cost
may com e o u t o f program s in m od
ernization. Investments postponed
in technological developm ent may
multiply over time. Com paring
defense and nondefense spending,
many o f the objectives o f the neolib
eral m odel have been of a short
term nature. C entral governm ent
expenditures are cut to m eet fiscal
targets today. National security is
16 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two

about investments for the future.
T he costs o f neglecting a coherent
long-term defense strategy may esca
late in the long run.
Despite the difficulties o f account
ing for time or o f exactly m easuring
the benefits and the costs, such
exercises are the basis for sound
policy planning. It is easy to say
that peacekeeping or regional
defense activity is good; the h ard er
question is to estimate just how
m uch it will add to a n atio n ’s securi
ty over time and at what level m ulti
lateral program s will detract from
o ther missions. T he scarce
resources available to governm ents
u n d er neoliberalism makes efficien
cy m atter m ore.
S o c ia l C o s t s

of

S t a b il iz a t io n

U nder neoliberalism , all central
governm ent expenditures are scaled
back. T he process o f structural
adjustm ent involves a painful
retren ch m en t o f social spending.
Program s designed to address
poverty, social safety nets and
em ploym ent suffer. Local and
national governm ents, pared down
in the nam e o f cost-cutting and effi
ciency, find it hard to m eet the
needs of the poor. T he World Bank

estimates that Latin America will
have to invest $60 billion annually
ju st to catch up with existing
dem ands for water, transportation,
electricity, sewage, ports and
telecom m unications. Investments
in the social sectors are even m ore
overwhelming.
As the state is less equipped to
tackle these social and infrastruc
ture deficits, there is an increased
likelihood o f violence. The uprising
in Chiapas, Mexico and the anarchy
in favelas in Brazil are indicators of
the degree of social decay and the
failure to m eet these m ounting
problem s with peaceful means. The
rising rate o f violent crimes in the
region has pushed governm ents,
including Brazil, the Dom inican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
H onduras, Nicaragua and
Venezuela, to call their arm ies into
the street. In the Dom inican
Republic the army was called in to
end three days o f rioting ignited by
a bus fare increase. T he Bolivian
army was called out to stop a teach
ers m arch in La Paz. It is n o t coin
cidental that when the Venezuelan
governm ent authorized increases on
the o rd er of 40 p ercen t for 44 basic
food items at the en d o f February
1995, the defense m inister present
ed President Caldera with a plan for
containing violence in the capital.
People are tired o f waiting for the
gains from econom ic adjustm ent.
They want a decent standard o f liv
ing with increasing opportunity for
their children - not fu rth er sacri
fice. T he region’s bishops blam ed
neoliberalism for the problem s of
extrem e poverty at a conference in
Mexico on May 7, 1995. Said
Venezuela’s R oberto Luckert, “ The
cruel neoliberalism [has created] a
barrel o f gunpow der which could
go off any time [by installing] the
dictatorship o f the m arket and mak
ing the dollar its G od.”
N ot only has spending on social
services suffered in the painful
adjustm ent dem anded by neoliber
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alism, b u t the ability to respond to
crises has also been weakened. As
local governm ents attem pt to
address a multiplicity o f dem ands
with lim ited resources, spending on
law enforcem ent is cut along with
social services. Local police forces
are unable to react to m aintain
internal peace. Given the limited
capacity o f law enforcem ent, the
military is increasingly being called
u p o n to m aintain internal order.
T he experience o f Guatemala,
Brazil, Mexico and P eru are clear
examples of the failure o f civilian
law enforcem ent to m eet the rising
tide o f violence.
This puts militaries in a policy
bind. O n the o ne hand, militaries
d o n ’t perceive their prim ary func
tion as keeping the internal peace.
O ne d o esn ’t jo in the military to
fight gang wars in slums. Yet civilian
authorities, unable to contain crises,
have ord ered the military to keep
the internal peace. Until resources
are available for enhanced law
enforcem ent, it is likely that mili
taries will continue to be called
u p o n to execute police functions.
Well organized and disciplined, mil
itaries perform well. This has led to
an im proved public profile o f the
military as an institution. Public
opinion apparently has a short
m em ory for costs o f military govern
m ent. W hen confronted with social
chaos, the public is increasingly
clam oring for the military to step in
to m aintain internal peace. Clearly,
this has a cost in term s o f the con
solidation o f democracy. N everthe
less, w ithout a strengthening o f the
capacity o f the state to both attend
to poverty and the conflict that is
created by social problem s, one
should n o t be surprised by m ore
tanks in the favelas.
P r e v e n t iv e P

o l ic ie s

Militaries, ever the defensive plan
ners, are looking to dissipate the
internal threats to stability. R ather
than com bat its citizens, the military

is working to eradicate the condi
tions leading to conflict and insta
bility. H um anitarian and nation
building activities have increased in
Latin America, as the arm ed forces
are em ployed in preventing the
sources o f violence.

People are tired of waiting
for the gains from economic
adjustment. They want a
decent standard of living
with increasing opportunity
for their children - not
further sacrifice.

Unidos, Universidad Candido Mendes
in Rio de Janeiro, has inform ed me
that private security forces guard
the entrances to upscale neighbor
hoods, and every building from the
m iddle class up has a doorm an that
doubles as an inspector. As in the
U nited States, malls with private
security agents have replaced city
centers as safe shopping meccas. As
the wealthy abdicate public spaces
for the haven of private protection,
this underm ines the ability of
m unicipalities to finance local and
state police forces. Already
stretched to m aintain law and order,
civilian governm ents in Brazil,
Bolivia, and Guatem ala find the mil
itary the only option to keep the
internal peace.
P r iv a t iz a t io n

A study by the Centro para la Paz y
la Reconciliation showed defense
spending accelerating in Central
America, a tren d accepted by a fear
ful public faced with the fact that
m ore than 60 percent of the
region’s 30 million inhabitants are
living below the poverty line. Once
again, as in reacting to violence, the
engagem ent o f the military in the
provision o f social services is n o t the
best policy choice. C onstruction
workers, no t colonels, should be
building roads. Teachers, no t sol
diers, should be prom oting literacy.
G reen brigades, not green berets,
should be working to improve envi
ronm ental conditions. But as the
capacity of the state to m eet the
social needs has been em asculated,
the military is increasingly moving
to provide em ergency services that
are no t being funded in civilian pro
grams.
Class distinctions may also play
into the internal security vacuum.
Wealthy neighborhoods in Latin
America have addressed the prob
lem o f increasing social tension by
moving to the m arket to purchase
security. Clovis Brigagao, o f the
Centro de Estudios Brasil-Estados

of

D

e fen se

T he drive toward privatization of
public enterprises in neoliberalism
has not missed the defense indus
tries in the region. EMBRAER, the
Brazilian state aeronautical firm , has
been privatized, with the Ministry of
A eronautics retaining a controlling
share for reasons of national securi
ty. FAMAE, which claims to be the
oldest m unitions firm in the region,
has moved from state ownership to
state m anagem ent o f the defense
acquisition process. A rgentina has
em barked on a wholesale privatiza
tion of its defense sector.
Privatization of military produc
tion has its advantages. EMBRAER
is better able to raise capital in
international markets, will be freed
from restrictive labor laws, and will
have m ore flexibility in product
developm ent than it did with a
stronger partnership with the
Brazilian Air Force. FAMAE is bet
ter positioned to m eet the needs o f
the Chilean arm ed forces by p u r
chasing essentially in the private
m arket and taking advantage o f an
open bidding process to procure at
the lowest possible cost. By subcon
tracting through competitive bids,
the firm doubled sales in 1994. The
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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needs o f the Chilean military are
b etter m et through efficient use of
m odernization resources. In
A rgentina the privatization of
defense firms has added to the cred
ibility o f its international liberaliza
tion package.
But privatization o f defense pro
duction may have political and tech
nological costs. Private firms are
less accountable to foreign policy
objectives. A com parison o f the his
torical activity o f EMBRAER with
th at o f ENGESA, the private tank
pro d u cer in Brazil, is telling. Stateowned EMBRAER’s custom er list which includes the U nited States,
E uropean and o th er Latin nations was significantly different from the
clients o f ENGESA, which included
Libya, Iraq and Angola. The activi
ties o f H ugo Piva and his Brazilian
engineering firm HOP in Iraq
caused considerable diplom atic ten
sion during the Gulf War, signifi
cantly dam aging U.S.-Brazilian rela
tions. The possible sales o f arm a
m ents from A rgentina and from
Chile to supply Ecuador in its con
flict with P eru p oint to the difficul
ties of control u n d e r free markets.
The privatization of defense pro
duction in the region m ust be
accom panied by strong and coher
en t control o f exports. This, how
ever, brings with it internal political
costs. Tides o f nationalism swell
when m unitions control laws are
exported seemingly wholesale from
the U.S. State D epartm ent. T he dif
ficulty in passing such a bill in Brazil
is instructive. H om e grown, subre
gional export control regimes may
prove m ore prom ising, should the
political will exist.
Internationalization has, by neces
sity, accom panied the privatization
o f defense in the region. N ot only
in Latin America, bu t throughout
the industrializing world as well,
going it alone in the defense arena
is n o t financially viable. Jo in t ven
tures and co-production agreem ents
are the vehicles to capture
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econom ies o f scale in defense pro
duction. EMBRAER has long had
international partners; ENAER and
ASMAR in Chile have collaborated
with the Israelis, am ong others.
Internationalization o f defense p ro 
duction is n o t new, bu t the pace is
accelerating.

The privatization of defense
production in the region
must be accompanied by
strong and coherent control
of exports.

While jo in t ventures are, in a
sense, the only gam e in town, their
costs should be acknowledged.
T he historical rationale for defense
p roduction in the region has
included a desire for autonom ous
p ro cu rem en t and developm ent of
indigenous technological capabili
ties. While the weight placed on
technological developm ent was cer
tainly stronger in Brazil and
A rgentina than in Chile, the im pe
tus to prom ote national capabilities
in high technology items through
the locom otive o f defense was p re
sent. U n d er im port substitution,
especially in Brazil an d A rgentina,
state-centered technological devel
o p m en t was to break the bottle
necks to industrial change.
Technological acquisition in the
neoliberal m odel is centered in the
in ternational private m arket. T he
prim ary actor, ra th e r than state
centers o f research and develop
m ent, is the m ultinational defense
firm . W hether this, on balance,
brings benefits or costs over the
long ru n rem ains to be seen. At
the very least, one m ust m onitor
the technological gains and losses
in the defense arena if the national
security goals o f autonom y are
retained.

T h e In t e r n a t io n a l M a r k e t

A critical part o f neoliberalism is a
successful export drive. Exports
generate hard currency which can
be reinvested for growth or used to
reduce external liabilities. O ne of
the shortcom ings of import-substitution industrialization was its neglect
o f exports as an engine for growth.
But over-exporting also has its costs.
T he race to export has pressured
the resource capacity o f nations to
sustain the external orientation.
This problem o f resource conflicts
has been alarmingly evident in the
fishing skirmishes. C ountries such
as A rgentina, Canada, Peru, Chile
and Brazil want control over coastal
fishing beyond their exclusive eco
nom ic zones (EEZs) guaranteed in
the Law o f the Sea Treaty. They
argue that it is imperative to police
beyond the 200-mile limit as stocks
are being depleted by hu n d red s of
fishing vessels from Spain, South
Korea, Taiwan and Russia - and the
fish d o n ’t neatly confine themselves
to the arbitrated limit. Defending
coastal resources has led to in tern a
tional incidents. This becomes less
surprising when international m ar
ket earnings from exports of
seafood have overtaken traditional
export fare such as beef in
A rgentina. Econom ic resource con
flicts becom e an issue o f military
security when diplomacy fails to
resolve com peting claims.
O th er resource-driven conflicts
have arisen in areas where borders
are not clearly defined or defensi
ble. The confrontations on the
Brazilian-Venezuelan border, for
example, are driven by the property
rights o f the garampeiros in search of
gold. M igration problem s are
caused by the lack of opportunity in
both the rural and urban sectors.
T he same conflicts may have taken
place u n d er the old developm ent
m odel. Today, however, economic
actors are m ore vulnerable to the
vagaries o f the m arket w ithout the
strong safety net o f the state.
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T he focus on com petition in the
international m arketplace has raised
the stakes in the international
growth game. Ironically, the com 
petitiveness o f the neoliberal m arket
creates externalities that can only be
solved by cooperation. As countries
are linked by invisible m arket flows,
they are at once fierce rivals and
m utually d ependent, particularly in
addressing the problem s the m arket
creates. Perm eable borders
increase the flow o f contraband and
people. T here is sentim ent in Brazil
that opening up coastal and inland
navigation to foreign com panies
endangers national sovereignty.
Narcotrafficking has found interna
tionalization to its advantage.
C om petition in m arkets has led to
the n eed for cooperation in security
and environm ental policies to
address the conflicts created by the
drive toward global production. In
contrast to the use o f force by the
state to defend m ercantile interests
in the precapitalist era, globalized
m arket structures will dem and new
forms of m ilitary cooperation to
enhance security.
N ew P a tte r n s

Douglas M acArthur said, “T here
is no security on this earth; there is
only opportunity.” W hat are the
o pportunities we n eed to consider
to improve security both within and
between nations given the chal
lenges o f the neoliberal model?
• Map Defense Resources into a
Policy Framework: To address the
inconsistencies in defense inputs
and outputs, security spending m ust
be m apped into a policy framework.
National and regional security
objectives m ust be redefined and
appropriations m ade to reflect the
changed security environm ent.
While this sounds so obvious, it is
n o t a simple task. Nationally, vested
interests o f various parts o f the
arm ed forces may be at stake. It will
be difficult to ask, on a line-by-line

basis, w hether the additional dollar
spent in one program exceeds its
potential benefits in another.
• Civic and Humanitarian Action:
Reversing the Permanent
Emergency: Given the increase in
social tensions and the lim ited
resources o f the state to address
them , the m ilitary will be asked to
perform internal policing func
tions. For many m ilitaries in the
region, this has long been defined
as com plem entary to their mission
of guaranteeing national security.
Ideally, police forces and social ser
vices are the front line in ensuring
internal peace. W hen this fails,
however, the m ilitary objective is to
contain the emergency. O ne o f the
im portant policy tasks is to plan for
the disengagem ent o f the m ilitary
after the crisis is over. H anding off
hum anitarian action to civilian
agencies is as im portant as respond
ing to the initial stages o f a crisis.
Given that in the m edium -term the
m ilitary is going to continue to be
an asset in the hands o f civilian gov
ernm ents trying to m ake do with
less, planning for the m echanism s
o f coordination between m ilitary
an d civilian agencies should
enhance the effectiveness o f public
policy.
• Consolidating Institutional
Reform in the Security Arena:
R eorienting the defense policy
debate to reflect new political and
econom ic realities will require the
developm ent o f new institutional
flexibility. In his essay “Latin
Am erica’s Jo u rn ey to the M arket”
(Journal of Democracy, Fall 1994),
Moises Naim suggests that stage
one o f the m arketization process
involved changing the set o f eco
nom ic rules; stage two, he con
tends, is the h ard work o f consoli
dating institutions. This m ust
include m ilitary institutions or the
military will becom e a dinosaur in
the new dem ocratic arena.

• Extend Regional Security
Cooperation: T he challenges o f the
m arket for the region d em and
greater cooperation in the hem i
sphere. Econom ies o f scale can be
captured in purchasing com patible
systems. Inter-operability is one
gain; an o th er can be found in
regional service and m aintenance
depots. W orking together to attract
high technology industries improves
regional bargaining power, rath er
than ceding the control to divide
and conquer to the m ultinational
firms. An inventory o f term s and
conditions of m ultinational p artn er
ships in the production o f defenserelated m aterials m ight enhance
bargaining power in technology
transfer agreem ents. Regional
annual m eetings o f pro cu rem en t
staffs for branches of the services
would no t only enhance transparen
cy bu t also identify areas for cooper
ative buying arrangem ents. While
cooperation in defense p rocure
m ent and production m ight seem to
ru n against the historical tide of
secret arms races for superiority, it is
likely that the security threats facing
Latin Am erica in the com ing
decades will dem and n o t defense
against neighboring armies, b u t
cooperatively com bating forces
beyond one n atio n ’s control.
A

P r a g m a tic N e o lib e r a lis m

The purpose o f this essay was n o t
to argue that neoliberalism be
thrown out, but rath er th at policy
be directed at the challenges this
new paradigm presents. This essay
is a call for pragm atism - an
acknow ledgm ent that all develop
m ent strategies have their costs and
benefits. T he challenges that the
neoliberal m odel has raised for the
security environm ent m erit both
short- and long-term policy adjust
ments. Addressing the com plicated
relationships in the econom ic and
security m arketplace can serve to
enhance the perform ance o f
both. ■
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Kidnapping Business

ently recruited well in Bolivia; high
ranking m em bers o f the Central
Obrera Boliviana, were also arrested
in connection with the kidnapping.

K idnapping in L adn Am erica has
reached epidem ic proportions.
T he February 1996 edition of
U.S./Latin Trade notes that kidnap
ping o f foreign and national execu
tives is a growing business. Weak
and often co rru p t law enforcem ent
and wealth disparity account for the
increase. Paradoxically, econom ic
growth in the region has increased
the opportunities for kidnappers as
m ore business executives have
arrived in each country. G one are
the days when guerrillas kidnapped
people in the nam e of some ideolo
gy; today, kidnapping is conducted
as an incom e redistribution m echa
nism. In this new scenario, govern
m ents are discovering that offering
guerrillas amnesty and integration
into political life is no t an attractive
offer when millions can be m ade
through kidnapping and extortion.

In January 1996, the U.S. embassy
in La Paz, Bolivia an n o u n ced th at it
was revoking form er president
Jaim e Paz Zam ora’s visa. Form er
party chief Oscar Eid Franco and
Paz Z am ora’s sister Edith, two of
the form er p resident’s closest allies,
also had their visas canceled. Since
early 1994, accusations th at Paz
Zam ora and his party, the
Movimiento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria had close connec
tions with narcotics traffickers have
led to the im prisonm ent o f Eid
Franco an d a com plete crisis in the
MIR. Paz Zam ora has already
an n o u n ced that he will ru n for
office in 1997 despite U.S. actions.

MRTA Expands

Walmart in Brazil

Intelligence reports have long
re p o rted th at the Movimiento
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
(MRTA), the Peruvian guerrilla
group claim ed to have been dis
m antled by President Fujimori, has
expanded its operations into
Bolivia. In D ecem ber 1995, MRTA
m em bers were arrested in La Paz
and M ontevideo accused o f kidnap
ping Samuel D oria Medina, a
wealthy industrialist and form er
m inister o f planning. Following
nearly 60 days in captivity, Doria
M edina was released after paying a
hefty ransom . T he MRTA has appar-

In the January 21 edition o f El
Nuevo Herald, K atherine Ellison
rep o rted that a real “W almart
R evolution” has occurred in Brazil.
W alm art recently op en ed two socalled Supercenters in the outskirts
of Brazil; over 10,000 clients
m obbed the store w hen it opened
and supervisors were forced to shut
the doors three times to prevent an
avalanche. O n the second day, the
store shut down two hours early
after selling out its inventory. But
no t everyone is pleased with
W alm art’s success. T he president of
Nestle accused the Arkansas- based
com pany o f dum ping practices to
keep prices artificially low. As
occurred in the U nited States, the
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Paz Zamora’s Visa Pulled

m ost affected are small retailers
who cannot com pete with the low
prices offered by megastores.

Crime and Punishment
T he H on d u ran m ilitary is feeling a
bit am bivalent these days. G eneral
Luis Alonso Discua, com m ander of
the arm ed forces and alleged to
have been involved in serious
hum an rights violations in the
1980s, was nam ed alternate ambas
sador to the U nited Nations. This
post is significant because
H onduras currently holds a seat on
the Security Council. At the same
time, however, the H o n duran
Suprem e C ourt ru led th at 10 mili
tary officers could be prosecuted
for the disappearance o f six stu
dents in 1982. It is still unlikely that
any officer will ever face trial.

Palito Goes to College
Palito O rtega, the form er governor
o f Tucum an, A rgentina has always
sought ways to improve himself. He
grew up as a street child and went
on to becom e revered by millions of
Latin Am ericans for his rom antic
songs an d movies. O rtega is now
getting ready to face the m ost seri
ous challenge o f his life; he is
preparing to ru n for the presidency
in the year 2000. In January, his
staff told Hemisphere th at as part o f a
strategy to becom e president, he
intends to pursue a degree in
International Relations at Florida
International University.

Investment Declines
According to the foreign investm ent
superin tendency o f Venezuela, for-

F

eign investm ent in Venezuela
declined by 43 p ercent between
January and Novem ber 1995 in
com parison to the same period in
1994. Investm ent capital reached
only $239.8 million, down from
$435.2 m illion in 1994. Most econ
omists believe that the decline is
rooted in the exchange controls
im posed in July 1994.

Abide by WTO Ruling?

I

E

L

standards. Mexican truckers, how
ever, believe that it is all a calculat
ed attem pt to allow U.S. trucking
firms to control the m arket.
Secretary P ena ann o u n ced that an
agreem ent would be signed after a
new ro u n d o f talks with Mexican
officials about im proving trucking
safety.

Government Perks

Venezuela and Brazil becam e the
first nations to test U.S. resolve to
abide by the rulings of the World
Trade O rganization (W TO). The
WTO ru led in January that the U.S.
Clean Air Act im posed standards
that interfere with free trade. The
Clinton adm inistration was prepar
ing to appeal the ruling which
states, am ong o th er things, that the
U.S. m ust pay trade sanctions until
1998 if it does n o t abide by the deci
sion. WTO guidelines m ust prevail
when they are in conflict with envi
ronm ental standards established by
specific m em ber countries.

President Ernesto Sam per issued a
decree on January 18, 1996 that
seeks to en d the perquisites o f pub
lic office. U nder the term s o f the
decree, Colom bian governm ent
functionaries are forbidden from
travelling in first class and cannot
host parties with public funds.
They also cannot charge business
cards, Christmas cards, and person
al phone calls/faxes to the
Colom bian taxpayers. T he objec
tive o f the decree is to reduce pub
lic spending by approxim ately $200
million, bu t is also part o f a cam
paign to clean up the governm ent’s
image.

NAFTA Delayed

Perks o f Office II

In late December, the U.S. govern
m en t dealt an o th er blow to the
im plem entation o f NAFTA by delay
ing Mexican truckers access to high
ways in the Southwest. After
prom ising n o t to oppose Mexican
truckers from entering into New
Mexico, Arizona and California,
Secretary Federico P ena gave into
pressures from b o rd er officials, traf
fic safety groups, the Teamsters and
politicians seeking to capitalize on
the anti-NAFTA sentim ent. These
groups n o ted that Mexican trucks
do n o t m eet U.S. safety and other

While the Colom bians were busy
cutting governm ent perks,
President Fujimori was defending
the right o f the National Police to
appropriate for personal use real
estate confiscated from narcotics
traffickers. In Novem ber 1995,
press reports stated that eight gen
erals of the National Police kept for
themselves luxurious hom es in
Lima that were seized from nar
cotics gangs. According to the
report, the hom es were used for
parties with a “lot o f liquor and
num erous young ladies.” President

Fujimori called the reports an
attem pt by narcotics traffickers to
force him to change the leadership
in the National Police.

Carriers to the Andes
T he U.S. D epartm ent o f
Transportation approved a
C ontinental Airlines request to be
allowed to fly to P eru and
Colombia. B eginning on M arch 16,
1996, C ontinental will introduce
ro u n d trip flights between Newark,
Lima and Bogota. C ontinental will
com pete with A m erican Airlines for
the A ndean market.

Saved by a Whisker
President Jose M aria Figueres of
Costa Rica m anaged to keep his
m ustache despite a prom ise to
shave it in exchange for a $5,000
donation from Gillette to the
National C hildren’s Hospital. The
kidnapping o f two E uropean
wom en on January 1 p u t a dam per
on the shaving ceremony. Standing
in for President Figueres was
C ostantino Urcuyo, a well-known
academ ic and a m em ber of
Congress, who sacrificed his mus
tache.

Wine Race
A January 15 Associated France
Press rep o rt noted th at A rgentina
has surpassed Chile in the export of
wine. In 1995, A rgentina exported
182.8 million liters, com pared to
C hile’s 102.2 million. Spain p ur
chased 84 p ercent o f A rgentine
wine exports. Chile still dom inates
Latin Am erican wine exports to the
U nited States. ■
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The Samper Scandal
M ary Beth Sheridan

o many people, he sym
bolized the best and the
brightest o f Latin
Am erica’s young elite.
Smart? At a m ere 25,
Ernesto Sam per led a
national banking association.
Cultured? He had rubbed elbows
with the wealthy elite since his days
at an exclusive Bogota prep school.
Charming? The witty Samper
endeared him self to big city journal
ists and coffee bean pickers.
It was n o t a surprise he would win
Colombia’s presidency in 1994. But
today, to the shock of Colombians,
the onetim e golden boy is em broiled
in South America’s biggest political
scandal - battling charges that he
came to power in a deal with the
largest cocaine kingpins.
Sam per staunchly denies knowing
leaders of the Cali cartel, which sup
plies up to 80 percent of U.S.
cocaine. He says that if any drug
money entered his campaign, it hap
pened “behind my back.” He points
to this adm inistration’s success in dis
m antling the cartel, jailing six top
chieftains.
Critics, however, call the 45-yearold Sam per a tragic symbol of
Colombia’s recent history. For years,
many Colombians tolerated drug
traffickers, even as they quietly
spread their tentacles through
Congress, the courts, the police.
Today, it’s not ju st Sam per who is
u n d er attack. It’s a country’s history.

T

H

is t o r ic a l

P e r m is s iv e n e s s

In early 1984, Spanish police burst
into an elegant apartm ent in down-

Mary Beth Sheridan is a staff urriter
with The Miami Herald.
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town Madrid. They slapped hand
cuffs on Gilberto Rodriguez
Orejuela, the Colombian who one
day would be called chief of the
world’s cocaine trade.

“If this infiltration [ of drug
money ] happened, in no way
- 1 repeat - no way did this
compromise the political will
of government in the fight
against drug trafficking. ”
U.S. authorities had already been
seeking Rodriguez Orejuela for six
years on trafficking charges. Police
scooped up thousands of dollars,
records of his drug shipments and
address books overflowing with pri
vate phone num bers. O ne was
Ernesto Sam per’s.
The book never becam e public,
and authorities barely noticed.
Samper, at the time, was merely a
Bogota councilm an. But even if he
were m ore im portant - thenPresident Belisario Betancur was also
listed - many Colombians probably
would have shrugged it off. “H ere
there was historical permissiveness
with contraband [smuggled] em er
alds, drugs,” noted Fernando
Cepeda, a Colombian political scien
tist.
The Rodriguez Orejuela brothers
- Gilberto and Miguel - were consid
ered a new breed, “gentlem en”
smugglers. Although they were want
ed in the U nited States, they were
running legal businesses in
Colombia - radio stations, drug
stores, the Banco de los

Trabajadores. “[Gilberto] was presi
dent of a bank. The politicians lined
up to take his money,” noted Patricia
Lara, publisher o f the newsweekly
Cambio 16.
Sam per declined to be interviewed
for this article or to answer written
questions.
D a n g e r o u s L ia is o n s

Cesar Villegas, a businessman with
an uncanny resemblance to Danny
de Vito, was the kind of guy a lot of
Colombians warmed to.
Extroverted. Funny. Generous. He
and Sam per m et while they were
graduate students, and Villegas said
the friendship grew through the
years. W hen Samper, then a presi
dential candidate, was wounded by a
gunm an in 1989, Villegas flew in a
Canadian specialist to operate on his
friend. Villegas lent Sam per his
Miami apartm ent to recuperate.
‘We had a great affinity,” Villegas
said. “You only do these things for
close friends.”
Last year Villegas’ nam e surfaced
in taped telephone conversations
that linked him to the Rodriguez
Orejuelas. In what was dubbed the
“narcocassette” scandal, the
Rodriguez Orejuelas discussed mak
ing large contributions to Samper's
campaign. The Cali leaders m ention
m eeting with Villegas - describing
him as an “emissary” of someone
seeking funds on behalf o f a presi
dential candidate.
Villegas insists he m et the
Rodriguez Orejuelas only two or
three times in the mid-1980s when
all three were investors in the profes
sional soccer business. “Two or three
times isn’t anything,” he said. But in
the fall of 1995, the U nited States
pulled Villegas’ visa, in part because
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A symbol of Colombia’s drug history

of concerns raised by the narcocas
sette scandal, according to U.S. offi
cials.
Villegas wasn’t Sam per’s only dan
gerous liaison. W hen Venezuelan
police broke up an alleged moneylaundering ring on the Colombian
border in O ctober 1993, they were
startled to discover Sam per’s hom e
phone num ber in the address book
of financier Sinforoso Caballero, a
senior Venezuelan judicial source
said. U.S. intelligence sources sus
pect Caballero o f being a major
money launderer though his case
was later overturned on appeal. The
Venezuelan Suprem e C ourt is consid
ering the case. Caballero, when con
tacted by The Miami Herald, denied
knowing Sam per or laundering
money.
Last August, a m ore shocking
friendship came to light. Colombian
news program s broadcasted a tape of
Sam per chatting warmly by phone
with Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria,
the wife of a suspected drug traffick
er. Samper, in a statem ent, said the
Sarrias w eren’t under investigation at
the time of the conversation last year.
But talk of Jesus Sarria’s alleged traf
ficking had swirled for years, accord
ing to Colombian intelligence offi
cials.
La t t e r D a y M o o n s h i n e r s

Rumors about Sam per’s past con
tacts with notorious people so con
cerned his aides in the 1994 cam
paign that they w arned Sam per to be
careful, a senior Liberal Party politi
cian said, speaking on condition of
anonymity. Nevertheless, Samper
held a key pre-election m eeting with
another presidential hopeful,
G eneral Miguel Maza Marquez, at
the hom e of Alberto Giraldo. The

journalist was widely known as a
“public relations m an” for the
Rodriguez Orejuelas. Giraldo is now
in jail on suspicion of accepting car
tel money.
If Sam per’s friendships would be
unheard of for a U.S. politician, they
w eren’t that unusual in Colombia.
Over the years, drug traffickers have
gained increasing influence in poli
tics and the nation’s favorite sport,
soccer. Many Colombians felt they
were hard to avoid.
The Cali Cartel did n ’t seem so
bad. Often pictured in pinstriped
suits, the Rodriguez Orejuelas
appeared a cut above the Medellin
C artel’s Pablo Escobar, whose group
was known for assassinating police
and presidential candidates.
“T here was violence [by Cali traf
fickers] but within the business,” said
Francisco Thoum i, author o f a book
on drug trafficking. In its zeal to
track down the violent Escobar, the
governm ent even worked with help
ful Cali members, officials said pri
vately. O f course, no t all Colombians
were blase about the Cali group;
some scrupulously avoided any links.
But in a country where m uch eco
nomic activity was illegal or semile
gal, in which the justice system was
paralyzed and drug use fairly low,
many people shrugged off drug traf
fickers as the equivalent of
Prohibition era moonshiners. “It’s
unlikely that, just because the United
States says, ‘this is bad,’ society sees it
that way,” Thoum i says.
A n I n v ig o r a t e d J u s t ic e S y st e m

Just a year ago, when the narcocas
settes first surfaced, the public and
the press were incredulous. News
papers quickly buried the implica
tions about the respected Samper.

“They seemed absurd,” said Maria
Jim ena Duzan, a prom inent
Colombian columnist. But it was a
different Colombia that received the
news that Sam per’s campaign trea
surer had been arrested in July 1995.
Stunning the nation, Santiago
M edina testified that the Samper
campaign had received at least $6
million from the Cali Cartel - per
haps half the campaign budget. In
exchange, he said, Samper promised
to ease conditions for the surrender
of the drug lords.
Newspapers descended on the
story with a fury. Times had
changed. At this point, 13 congress
m en and the national auditor gener
al were under investigation in a
probe into drug corruption. It was
led by Alfonso Valdivieso, the dynam
ic new attorney general who enjoys
extraordinary independence u n d er
Colombia’s 1991 constitution.
Increasingly skeptical newspapers
pounced on evidence of campaign
irregularities and contributions from
alleged traffickers. Even decade-old
contacts between politicians and car
tel m em bers becam e news. The
newsweekly Cambio 16, for example,
trum peted a radio license granted to
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela by minis
ter Noemi Sanin in 1986. Sanin,
who is expected to ru n for president
in 1998, has replied that at the time
Rodriguez Orejuela faced no crimi
nal charges. “This is the change that
Valdivieso is causing,” said Lara, pub
lisher of Cambio 16. ‘T h is is a most
im portant change in the country.”
Sam per responded to allegations
about drug money in his campaign
by pointing to his governm ent’s
crackdown on the cartels, launched
last spring u n d er strong U.S. pres
sure. “If this infiltration [of drug
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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money] happened, in no way - I
repeat - no way did this com pro
mise the political will of governm ent
in the fight against drug trafficking,”
he told CNN in an interview in
August 1995. “The tru th is, at this
m om ent, six o f the seven chiefs of
the Cali Cartel are prisoners.”
At Sam per’s request, a congres
sional com m ittee investigated
w hether he accepted drug money.
[The com m ittee found no evidence
to indict Sam per and the U.S. com 
plained that it had no t been a very
serious effort. In any event, Sam per
was cleared.] T hree of his top cam
paign aides are in prison, suspected
o f taking campaign contributions.
“T here has been a radical change,
said Cepeda, the political scientist.
“Before people did business [with
traffickers], b ought from them , sold
to them , went to their parties.
T h at’s history.”
Enrique Parejo, an anti-drug cru
sader and form er justice minister,
chalks up the difference to an invig
orated justice system. “For the first
time, there is evidence,” Parejo said.
“T he m iracle has come in putting
people in im portant positions who
looked for evidence - and found it.”
A change in the easygoing attitude
of Colombians toward traffickers
could be crucial for U.S. interests.
U.S. officials have long been frus
trated by the traffickers’ ability to
influence laws and win official
favors.
Few do u b t th at the drug lords will
seek to contribute to future cam
paigns. But candidates will likely be
far m ore careful.
“Sam per has tu rn ed into a symbol,
a personification of the rejection of
d ru g trafficking, said Enrique
Santos, m anaging editor o f the
Bogota daily El Tiempo. “Sam per is
paying for everyone’s broken
plates.” ■
Revised version of article which
appeared in The Miami Herald
November 5, 1995 p i and 31A.
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BUSINESS REPORTS - U P C O M IN G
Chile's Accession to NAFTA: Impact and Opportunity
Chile is expected to have minimal immediate economic
impact on the U.S., yet it is one of Florida's leading trade
partners. How will Chile's accession affect Florida and
the U.S.? Accession, Chile's investment climate, general
policy environment, and trade environment are exam
ined with special emphasis on Florida.

Annual Hemispheric Trade Report
For the trader, strategist, and economic development
community, this first Annual Report presents analyses of
three to five year trends in merchandise trade between
the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean. Growth
commodities and Florida's competitive regions in the
U.S. will also be identified.

MERCOSUR-Florida Relations
The second largest trading bloc within the Americas,
MERCOSUR is an enigma to many businesses. This
report examines MERCOSUR with an eye to understand
ing its business climate, and is directed to business and
industry executives.

Association o f Caribbean States (ACS)
Newly created, the ACS is the second leading region for
Florida's trade with the Americas. It also encompasses
most of the smaller economies in the hemisphere. What
is the ACS, and are there opportunities for Florida's com
mercial sector?

Summit of the Americas Center
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solutions

The Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology (HCET)
and the Tatin American and Caribbean Center
would like to announce the formation of their partnership
HCET's vision is to become a model bridging institute in the Western Hemisphere
for diffusing environmental technologies that promote mutual economic
benefit and sustainable development in the United States and the Americas.
HCET's mission is to develop and market technologies for
solving environmental problems throughout the Americas.
HCET encourages the development and use of sustainable technologies as a
means of preserving the environment while fostering economic development.
HCET offers the following benefits to partners
in the U.S., Latin America, and the Caribbean:
• Science and engineering capabilities
• Cost-effective technology development
• Technology assessment
• Access to markets and technology resources

For more information, contact:
M l Ebadian, Ph.D.
Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology
Florida International University
Voice (305) 348-4238/FAX (305) 348-4176
E-mail: ebadian@eng.fiu.edu
World Wide Web Site: http://www.fiu.edu/~hcet
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The Art of Narcofunding
Eduardo A. G am arra

n the past decade, Latin
American democracy has
been defined largely by the
holding o f regular and com 
petitive elections. Every coun
try has placed a great deal of
weight on the electoral ritual that
occurs every two, four, five, a n d /o r
six years. W ithout a doubt, periodic
electoral contests are crucial to the
deepening of the dem ocratization
process in the region.
T he prevalence o f elections, how
ever, has brought to the surface a
disturbing trend: allegations of illicit
funds entering electoral campaigns.
In the past two years, political par
ties and their candidates in Bolivia
and Colombia have been charged
with receiving campaign contribu
tions from narcotics traffickers.
Candidates in o th er countries have
succum bed to the same type of elec
toral financing. Those who have
rem ained im m une to this trend are
likely to face similar situations in the
near future.
Two reasons account for this
trend. First, ru n n in g for office in
Latin America has becom e a very
expensive venture. The costs o f hir
ing U.S. consultants, conducting sur
veys, and m ounting electoral
machines have skyrocketed in the
past few years, forcing parties to
tu rn primarily to the drug industry.
T he absence o f large private sector
donors and fund-raising campaigns
has also contributed to this disturb
ing trend.
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Second, as in most dem ocratic sys
tems, the sad reality is that money
buys votes and influences policy.
Increasingly, traffickers have
attem pted to purchase candidates
with the objective of securing favor
able treatm ent, interrupting efforts
to conduct counternarcotics opera
tions, and securing policy initiatives
that favor their industry. In this
sense, drug traffickers behave no dif
ferently than the average corporate
d onor to a U.S. campaign.

past, especially when the winning
candidates are the ones u n d er suspi
cion. This situation has occurred
twice in the past six years. Jaim e Paz
Zamora of Bolivia in 1989, and
Ernesto Sam per o f Colombia in
1994 allegedly accepted funds from
traffickers to ru n their campaigns.
This essay com pares the narcoticsrelated funding in Bolivia and
Colombia and examines U.S.
responses in each case.
D

The U.S. has confronted a
very significant dilemma.
Promoting democracy and
free elections has come
up against the reality of
illicit drug tainted
campaign funds.

Because no laws exist prohibiting
drug lords from contributing to the
electoral campaigns of their favorite
candidates, the situation in Latin
America is particularly difficult. No
country in the region has adopted
serious campaign financing reform
legislation. Thus, all electoral cam
paigns in the future will be affected
in some m easure by the presence of
illicit funds.
In this context, the U.S. has con
fronted a very significant dilemma.
Prom oting democracy and free elec
tions has come up against the reality
of illicit drug tainted campaign
funds. Responding to this issue has
not been easy and has led to trying
circumstances in the im mediate

rug s,

L ie s

and

V id e o t a p e s

In 1988, as Bolivia prepared to
enter into its national electoral
cycle, videos and pictures com pro
mising nearly every major political
party with drug lords surfaced.
Despite a great deal of U.S. concern,
these were quickly brushed aside
and the campaign went on as sched
uled.
Despite placing third in 1989, the
Movimiento de hquierda Revolucionaria’s (MIR) Jaim e Paz Zamora
becam e president of Bolivia thanks
to a congressional runoff. Paz
Zamora, a prom ising Social
Democrat, was one of the prom inent
figures posing in the so-called narcofotos with Isaac “Oso” Chavarria, con
sidered one of Bolivia’s top drug
traffickers. Accusations surfaced
that Chavarria had donated
$100,000 to the MIR’s campaign.
U.S. drug enforcem ent agents and
then U.S. ambassador Robert S.
Gelbard were aware of the allega
tions. Arguing that Bolivian dem oc
racy was too fragile, they did nothing
to make the issue public. Instead,
prom inent MIR m em bers socialized
with Gelbard and continued their
cozy relationship with Chavarria.
Gelbard did note, however, his con
cerns about drug-related corruption
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to his superiors in W ashington but,
at least in the initial rounds, did
nothing to bring the issue to public
light.
In his few years as ambassador,
Gelbard established a huge coun
ternarcotics bureaucracy in Bolivia,
by far the largest in Latin America.
Was knowledge of Paz Zam ora’s
links with Chavarria used to justify
the construction of this huge enter
prise? Were U.S. interests best
served by keeping the inform ation
about Paz Zam ora a secret?
During Paz Zam ora’s four years in
office, the U.S. established a series
of rigid counternarcotics param e
ters. It sought and obtained the
eradication o f coca fields, designed
an extradition law, and militarized
the entire counternarcotics effort in
Bolivia as both a militarized police
and regular units of the arm ed
forces participated in operations
throughout the country.
Paz Zam ora and his most prom i
n en t supporters, however, played a
strange game o f chicken with the
U nited States and with Gelbard.
Each time a counternarcotics opera
tion was to occur, inform ation was
leaked to traffickers, forcing the U.S.
to keep Bolivians out o f the loop. In
1991, Paz Zam ora nam ed Colonel
Fausdno Rico Toro to head the
Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el
Narcotrafico. Rico Toro was known to
have had a long involvement with
drug trafficking. Ambassador
Gelbard cut off U.S. assistance, Rico
Toro resigned and business seemed
to go on as usual in bilateral rela
tions. Subsequent ministers of inte
rior, FELCN com m anders and oth
ers were allegedly tainted by the
d ru g industry as well. Still the U.S.
funded Bolivia and certified the Paz

Zam ora governm ent’s com pliance
with anti-drug efforts.
Paz Zam ora stepped down in
August 1993 and went about his
duties as a form er president. He
was invited to the Wilson Center, he
was invited to serve on an interna
tional peace negotiating team in
Chiapas, and prepared him self to
ru n for re-election in 1997. In
February 1994, however, the U.S.
tu rn ed over inform ation linking Paz
Zam ora to Chavarria. Every piece
of inform ation was the same as what
was available in 1988 in the video
tapes and photographs. With Paz
Zam ora out o f office, the conse
quences on Bolivian dem ocracy
were less significant bu t in some
m easure destabilizing. T he current
Sanchez de Lozada governm ent
launched a m ajor investigation into
Paz Zam ora’s so-called narcovinculos
and jailed prom inent m em bers of
the MIR. For all intents and pur
poses, Paz Zam ora’s re-election bid
in 1997 has been halted. And, the
U.S. has canceled the form er presi
d e n t’s m ultiple entry visa into the
U.S.
In short, U.S. interests may have
been best served by working with
Paz Zam ora despite evidence link
ing him and his party to prom inent
drug traffickers. Moreover, Bolivian
dem ocracy survived because the
U.S. chose no t to accuse a sitting
president with narcolinks.
Sa m per g a te

Allegations o f narcofunding of
electoral campaigns in Colombia
have been around for at least a
decade. N one, however, ever
reached the proportions of the cur
rent scandal involving President
Ernesto Samper. T he events are

rath er well known. In mid-May
1994, shortly after being defeated in
the second round, Conservative
party candidate Andres Pastrana
announced that he had com e across
tapes linking Ernesto Sam per’s cam
paign to the Cali Cartel. T he tapes
revealed a conversation between
Alberto Giraldo, a rath er controver
sial journalist and presum ed
spokesperson for the Cali Cartel,
and one o f the Rodriguez O rejuela
brothers. Presenting him self as an
interm ediary for the Liberal Party,
Giraldo requested a contribution
from the Cali Cartel.
Ernesto Sam per denied all allega
tions, suggesting that they were part
of P astrana’s effort to becom e presi
d en t despite the electoral defeat.
State D epartm ent and DEA officials,
however, believed th at there was
substance to the charges. State
D epartm ent officials m et with
Sam per in New York City before his
inauguration in mid- 1994 to warn
him o f the possible consequences
on U.S.-Colombian relations if the
charges were no t investigated and
cleared. N onetheless, Sam per was
inaugurated president. Shortly
thereafter, Republicans in the U.S.
Congress pushed for increasing
pressure on Colombia, pressed for
decertification, and for the imposi
tion o f trade sanctions. T he DEA
and State D epartm ent initiated a
m uch less publicized cam paign to
force Sam per to com e clean.
Despite State D epartm ent and
DEA concerns, the Colom bian situa
tion was placed on the backburner
while the Clinton adm inistration
em barked on the planning o f the
Summit o f the Americas. For most
of 1994, the U.S. said little in public
about the electoral funding scheme.
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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In the context o f the Summ it of
the Americas planning process,
Colombia put forth a proposal to
com bat m oney laundering, which
went on to becom e part of the
Summ it Action Plan signed by all 34
heads o f state who attended the
D ecem ber 1994 event in Miami. On
a few occasions both President Bill
Clinton and Vice President A1 Gore
praised Sam per for C olom bia’s
efforts to com bat drugs. These
com m endations did no t reflect the
underlying tensions between
W ashington and Bogota and caught
U.S. d ru g enforcem ent officials off
guard.
While Sam per looked good in
Miami pledging to com bat money
laundering, the reality in Colombia
was quite different. T he Colombian
Congress refused to pass a law that
would have looked into illicit
sources o f fortunes. It also did not
consider campaign financing
reform proposals.
In sharp contrast to the feel good
am biance of the Miami Summit, in
M arch 1995 the U.S. Congress
approved President C linton’s rec
om m endation th at Colombia
receive “national interest certifica
tio n ,” a new category that essentially
placed Colom bia in a situation of
noncom pliance with co u n tern ar
cotics efforts. Moreover, the DEA’s
m ain m an in Bogota departed
Colom bia labeling the country a
“narcodem ocracy.” This partial cer
tification and the DEA’s com m ents
sparked a great deal o f Colombian
nationalism and added to a pattern
o f general deterioration o f U.S.Colom bian relations.
To mitigate U.S. pressure, Sam per
em barked what m ight be term ed
the most significant offensive ever
launched against the Cali Cartel. In
one year, six pro m inent m em bers of
the Cali Cartel were arrested,
including the Rodriguez O rejuela
b rothers and Jose Santa Cruz
Londono. Sam per’s efforts aim ed
to dem onstrate to W ashington that
28 Hemisphere
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if his cam paign in 1994 had been
funded by traffickers, he would not
have brought them down so quickly.

The U.S. faces two options:
to pursue a public and
moral crusade to force
corrupt politicians out of
office and generate a great
deal of turmoil, instability,
and anti-americanism; or, to
design a covert effort to
force corrupt government
officials in Latin America to
accept counternarcotics
operations in the name of
saving democracy.

Despite these efforts, the U.S.
viewed the Colom bian situation with
skepticism. Questions regarding the
cam paign financing scandal were
still there. The allegations against
Sam per and the Liberal Party
becam e m ore significant as key peo
ple in the campaign, such as
Santiago Medina, the treasurer,
came forth with accusations that the
president knew o f the scheme to
solicit funds from the Cali Cartel.
Moreover, the U.S. was uncertain
about the sentences to be im posed
on Cali drug traffickers and the
ability of the Colom bian govern
m ent to keep them in prison. The
dram atic escape o f Jose Santa Cruz
L ondono in January 1996 con
firm ed U.S. concerns.
To fight accusations o f a cover-up,
Sam per nam ed a congressional
commission to look into the
charges. In theory, the congression
al commission could have found
enough evidence to initiate an
im peachm ent-like process against
Samper. In late Septem ber, Sam per

faced nine hours of questioning by
the congressional commission.
T he investigation into the scandal
and U.S. counternarcotics efforts in
Colombia received a considerable
boost when Guillerm o Palom ari, the
form er treasurer of the Cali Cartel,
tu rn ed him self over to U.S. authori
ties. O nce in U.S. territory,
Palom ari’s revelations to the DEA
confirm ed many o f the statem ents
provided by Santiago M edina.
On D ecem ber 6, 1995, the
congressional commission appoint
ed by Sam per to look into the alle
gations ruled that it had found no
evidence to indict the president.
U.S. authorities expressed disbelief
and accused the congressional com
mission of having ruled on a parti
san basis. In W ashington’s eyes, the
ruling confirm ed suspicions that a
well orchestrated cover-up was in
the works. U.S. reaction again
sparked nationalistic cries and accu
sations o f intrusion into Colom bia’s
dom estic affairs. Given the congres
sional ruling, the U.S. placed all of
its hopes on the investigation
launched in early 1995 by Attorney
G eneral Alfonso Valdivieso.
Valdivieso was widely supported by
U.S. authorities who perceived him
as honest. Valdivieso’s investigation,
however, was lengthy and slow.
Events in Colom bia moved very
quickly following the congressional
clearing o f Samper. The U.S. stood
by silently as m ajor actors in the
drug funding scandal confirm ed the
allegations. T he m ost serious
occurred on January 22, 1996 when
form er defense m inister and cam
paign m anager F ernando Botero
told a Colom bian news team and
the U.S.-based Univision television
network that he had known o f the
payments, that Sam per had lied all
along, and that a cover-up had been
orchestrated.
Calls for Sam per’s resignation
came from nearly every sector of
Colombian society. U.S. State
D epartm ent and DEA officials kept
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silent in public b u t acknowledged in
private conversations their desire to
have Sam per step down. In the
m eantim e, U.S. officials prepared
the annual certification report for
Congress. With Sam per clinging to
office, U.S. decertification and the
imposition o f trade sanctions
appeared a very distinct possibility.
In short, U.S. drug policy in
Colombia went through four phases.
First, State D epartm ent officials
headed by R obert Gelbard sought to
confront Samper, presumably to
force an early resignation. Second,
the U.S. chose to keep the narco
funding scandal out o f the public
limelight while the Summit of the
Americas was in the works. Third, it
waited for Colombian congressional
and judicial authorities to investigate
Sam per and simultaneously applied
national interest certification.
Finally, the U.S. applied a silent
approach, hoping that Sam per
would resign without signs o f direct
interference from Washington. Did
this approach work or did it con
tribute to the most serious political
crisis faced by Colombia since at
least the 1950s?

In Colombia, the very public bat
tle between U.S. officials and the
Sam per governm ent has created a
very tense situation in bilateral rela
tions and, m ore significantly, has
precipitated the country’s worst
political crisis of the second half of
the 1900s. The situation in Colombia
is different in scale to the Bolivia in
that it draws a lot m ore attention in
the U nited States because of the Cali
Cartel specter. Nevertheless, it is not
clear at this ju n ctu re w hether U.S.
interests have been served best by
the public trial of President Samper.
Finally, despite the Paz Zamora
and Sam per experiences, it is unlike
ly that Latin American political par
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U.S. responses in these two cases
highlight the complexity of dealing
with the proliferation of narcofund
ing of Latin American electoral cam
paigns. Supporting democracy and
pursuing drug policy has proven to
be quite difficult when elected offi
cials cater to traffickers and solicit
campaign contributions from them.
From the com parison between Paz
Zam ora and Samper, one conclusion
m ight be that in the interests of
m aintaining political stability and
furthering U.S. interests, the allega
tions ought to be handled privately.
The outcom e in Bolivia was clear.
U.S. policy interests were served in
the short term as the governm ent
followed W ashington drug policy
dictates. At the same time, Bolivia’s
incipient democracy was m aintained.

ties and their candidates will refuse
funds from drug lords to fund their
electoral campaigns. Cam paign
financing reform laws are unlikely
in the near future, d ru g trafficking
is not likely to slow down, and
dem ocratic elections are likely to
continue. T he U.S. faces two
options: to pursue a public and
m oral crusade to force co rru p t
politicians ou t o f office and g ener
ate a great deal of turm oil, instabili
ty, and anti-Americanism; or, to
design a covert effort to force cor
ru p t governm ent officials in Latin
America to accept counternarcotics
operations in the nam e of saving
democracy. I
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In the Balance
D a vid Pion-Berlin

n Argentina, military subordi
nation to civilian control is
hardly a topic o f conversation
anymore. The arm y’s accep
tance o f democracy is pre
sum ed and serves only as a
point o f d eparture for serious dis
cussion on o th er matters, such as
the m odernization of defense,
A rgentina’s role in the new world
order, or its participation in U nited
Nations-sponsored peacekeeping
missions abroad. Those who are
familiar with A rgentina’s militarized
past and its historically weak civilian
institutions may bristle at the notion
that the praetorian era is a thing of
the past. They may conclude that
cu rren t Argentine views reflect wish
ful thinking m ore than realistic
appraisals of the balance of force.
Perhaps it is too soon to write off
the arm ed forces as a powerful and
dangerous political actor, but there
may be som ething to this new found
air o f optimism.
The unobstructed transfer of
power from a Radical Party govern
m ent to a Peronist governm ent on
July 8, 1989, m arked an im portant
m ilestone in the process o f dem oc
ratic reconstruction. N ot since the
1920s had one elected president
peacefully transferred power to
another, with the military sitting qui
etly on the sidelines. Now with
Carlos M enem ’s re-election as presi
dent, the p attern o f orderly dem oc
ratic succession continues. Perhaps
the greatest test o f com pliance has
been the m ilitary’s extraordinary
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restraint in the face of declining pre
rogatives and a dim inished sphere
o f influence. Reductions in the mili
tary budget for salaries, operations
and procurem ent, the privatization
of military holdings, the term ination
o f im portant missile projects, and
legislative restraints on all internal
security missions were both unprece
dented and unrelenting. All went
virtually unchallenged by the arm ed
forces.

Those who are familiar
with Argentina’s militarized
past and its historically
weak civilian institutions
may bristle at the notion
that the praetorian era is a
thing of the past.

The arm ed forces is still an im por
tant institution with its own interests
to defend, but there is a great differ
ence between the extralegal forms
o f military pressure used in the past
and the institutionalized pressure
exhibited today. With few excep
tions, the m ilitary’s objections to
policy are expressed through proper
channels. Officials privately and
diplomatically register their com 
plaints with the defense minister,
while military enlaces (lobbyists) take
their cause directly to the Congress.
W hen so many scholars have
insisted for so long that military cor
porate interests must be satisfied to
secure com pliance, it is curious
indeed that an equilibrium has been
achieved in Argentina, despite the

losses suffered by the arm ed ser
vices. Who or what is ultimately
responsible for this state of affairs?
E q u il ib r iu m

These achievements began prior
to the current M enem and the pre
vious Alfonsin administrations.
Perhaps the first steps toward equi
librium were the m ilitary’s own self
destructive acts. The unquestion
able political and econom ic failures
of the Proceso de Reorganization
National (Proceso), along with
A rgentina’s defeat in the 1982 War
of the South Atlantic (Malvinas/
Falklands), left indelible marks on
the m en of arms and the society
they had refused to serve. The mili
tary was stained by its participation
in a regim e notorious for repression,
self aggrandizem ent and incom pe
tence. Argentine society bore the
b ru n t of this and held the arm ed
forces both morally and politically
responsible.
T he Proceso ju n ta presided over a
ruined economy and tu rn ed a limit
ed counterinsurgency operation into
a dirty war against civilians. The
resulting loss o f faith in program 
matic objectives led to the em er
gence o f serious cleavages along per
sonalities, branches o f service and
ideologies. These contributed not
only to the regim e’s hasty demise,
but to a profound dem oralization of
the profession itself. This condition
was then exacerbated by defeat in
war and subsequent revelation of
deficient, improvisational and errorridden military conduct. The
arm ed forces’ dismal perform ance
in governance and in war con
tributed to the degeneration o f the
institution, allowing incom ing civil
ian governm ents to accomplish far
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Argentina \s delicate civil-military equilibrium

m ore than would have been possible
in the absence o f military defeat.
Alfonsin led the charge, using the
power of his office to further restrict
the m ilitary’s political reach, punish
it for past offenses and curb its eco
nom ic appetite. His program
heightened the m ilitary’s fears
about the new dem ocratic order, as
it sought to impose, rather than
court, military subordination to civil
ian rule. The reduction o f military
prerogatives, w ithout sufficient com 
pensation, contributed to deep
resentm ent at the m iddle and lower
ranks, eventually spilling over the
rebellions of 1987 and 1988.
It is easy to blam e Alfonsin for the
n atio n ’s instability and to credit
M enem for the restoration of that
stability. But it would be a mistake
to suggest that the Radical Party
chief did nothing m ore than
bequeath to his successor a prob
lematic civil-military relationship.
W hatever else can be said about
Alfonsin’s hum an rights strategy, the
sentencing o f the ex-com m andants
weakened the principle o f im punity
and m ade evident the dem ocratic
regim e’s refusal to allow military
transgressions to go unanswered. In
setting new limits, Alfonsin altered
the param eters of the civil-military
game, creating opportunities for his
successors to interact with the
arm ed forces w ithout the fear o f a
military coup. M enem could reward
good behavior knowing that to con
cede was n o t to capitulate; that one
reward would n o t unleash a torrent
of new and unreasonable military
dem ands which, if unfulfilled, would
generate calls for a change of
regime. Conversely, M enem could
withhold rewards to the arm ed
forces in o rd er to husband or redis

tribute scarce resources, confident
that the arm ed forces would abide
by the decision.
Fa c in g D

ow n the

“ C a r a p in t a d a s”

The new civil-military equilibrium
also owes its existence to the m an
n er in which both Alfonsin and
M enem dealt with the military
rebels, or carapintadas (painted
faces) as they were called. After the
Holy Week revolt of April 1987, the
ruling Radical Party lost some
ground by calling for a partial
amnesty for hum an rights offenders.
The move was widely perceived as
caving in to rebellious colonel Aldo
Rico. But in other aspects, Alfonsin
held his ground. He refused to
yield to their dem ands that the next
chief of the army be selected from a
list of five candidates hand-picked by
Rico, and instead appointed General
Jose Dante Caridi. H e did not grant
im munity to the rebels, and had his
military com m and m anipulate
assignments and prom otions in a
way that marginalized Rico’s loyal
ists.
With the appointm ent of General
Caridi, Alfonsin established a prece
dence o f defying the carapintadas.
This continued u n d er M enem, who,
over the objection of the carapin
tadas’All Seineldin, designated
General Isidro Caceres as the new
army head. Beginning with Caceres,
each subsequent prom otion within
the army w eakened the hand of the
carapintadas while strengthening the
hand of the “pure professional,”
men like Caceres who were linked
neither to mutiny nor bureaucratic
inaction. As pure professionals,
these soldiers are strict observers of
military rank and, for the most part,
rem ain uncom prom isingly subordi

nate to the constitutional o rd er and
its elected officials. General M artin
Bonnet, Caceres’s successor, and
General M artin Balza, the cu rren t
head of the arm y’s general staff, fall
into these categories. Personnel
changes of this sort have produced a
military com m and which is both
respected by the rank and file and
respectful of the governing authori
ties.
M enem ’s contribution to the cur
ren t state of civil-military relations is
often m isunderstood. It is taken for
granted that his O ctober 1989 par
don o f some 216 officers charged
with mutiny and hum an rights abus
es paved the way for im proved rela
tions. But balancing his forgiveness
was the firmness with which he
responded to the abortive coup
attem pt of D ecem ber 1990. The
uprising, which resulted in 13
deaths (two o f the victims were sol
diers) and 350 injuries, was particu
larly em barrassing to the president,
com ing as it did on the eve o f a
scheduled visit to A rgentina by for
m er U.S. President George Bush.
The angry com m ander-in-chief
quickly ordered troops to extinguish
the uprising and urged the Military
Suprem e Council to m ete o u t stiff
punishm ent for the perpetrators.
Fifteen co-conspirators, including
Seineldin, lost their military status
and rem ain behind bars
Like Alfonsin before him, M enem
set careful limits on permissible mili
tary action. But unlike Alfonsin, the
Peronist leader has also been able to
establish a rapport with the arm ed
services. T here is a m utual u n d er
standing and respect which has
translated into greater self-restraint
on the part o f the military. With the
burden of prosecution for past
Hemisphere
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transgressions lifted, bu t with the
knowledge that future ones will not
be tolerated, the officer corps has
cooperated with policies that in
an o th er time and context would
have been intolerable.
C avallo, C a n

you

S pare

a

D

im e ?

Nowhere is this m ore apparent
than with the m ilitary budget.
While defense expenditures plum 
m eted by 40 p ercent during the first
three years of the Alfonsin adm inis
tration, cuts were even steeper and
m ore sustained u n d e r Menem.
Military spending as a percentage
o f gross dom estic p roduct (GDP)
went from 2.75 p ercent in
Alfonsin’s last year to 2.15 percent
in M enem ’s first year, to less than 2
p ercen t thereafter. T he arm y’s bud
get (not expenditures) went from
560 million pesos in 1987 to 105
m illion by 1991, an 81 percent
decline. By 1993, there was no
m oney left in the accounts o f either
the army, air force or navy for new
eq u ip m en t or m aintenance. To
date, this situation has not
im proved, although m odest salary
m easures are projected to m ake the
new all-volunteer army m ore attrac
tive to recruits. U nable to support
themselves o r their families on m ea
ger military salaries, many officers
leave the barracks by m idday to
hold down jo b s in the civilian sec
tor. O thers have simply abandoned
the services all together. But by and
large, the arm ed forces have accept
ed these changes.
T he objective o f the M enem gov
ern m en t has n o t been to punish the
arm ed forces, b u t rather to fulfill
m acroeconom ic goals as set by the
all-powerful econom ics minister,
Dom ingo Cavallo. Am ong
A rgentine defense specialists, the
consensus is th at limits to military
spending are established by Cavallo
and no one else. A nd for Cavallo,
there are three com pelling reasons
why the arm ed forces m ust try to
make do with less.
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T he first is that all sectors in
A rgentine society have been called
on to do exactly the same. The
watchwords u n d e r M enem have
been “shared sacrifice.” In spread
ing the costs o f austerity, the gov
ern m e n t has been able to diffuse
opposition to what surely has been
a painful adjustm ent program . And
it is that program , Cavallo claims,
which has allowed the nation to
experience an impressive econom ic
recovery, m arked by the elim ination
o f the fiscal deficit, the lowering of
m onthly inflation to less than a per
centage point in 1995 (and a nega
tive rate for the m onth o f August)
and the restoration of stability and
growth to an econom y that had
seen n eith er in decades.

In coming to terms with
its own disreputable past,
the military has helped
rehabilitate its standing.
The Argentine nation
is the beneficiary.
T he second reason, equally per
suasive, is that the nation no longer
needs a large m ilitary because the
threatening environm ent of the
past has changed. T he war with
Great Britain is over, tensions with
Chile have been eased considerably
through the signing o f border
agreem ents, and A rgentina’s p eren 
nial rival to the north, Brazil, is now
an econom ic p artn e r in the newly
created free-trade zone known as
MERCOSUR. C ooperation and
integration, rath er than geopolitical
rivalry, characterizes relations
between these Southern Cone
neighbors, ren d erin g the military
th reat to A rgentina’s sovereignty
lower than it has been in recent
memory. Since defensive needs are
assessed in p roportion to risk, then

significant spending reductions
were probably w arranted.
Third, A rgentina is a perfect test
case o f the theorem that bigger is
not necessarily better. In 1982, the
country’s 200,000-man military, with
an impressive stockpile of weapons,
and a 37 p ercent share of all public
sector expenditures (com pared to
16.6 percent in Chile), went down in
defeat at the hands o f the British.
Rapacious military spending could
no t purchase the kind of defense
the country needed. Now, the mili
tary com m and is the first to adm it
that what A rgentina needs is a lean
er, m ore efficient, and m ore cost
effective fighting force.
T he downsizing of the Argentine
military has been going on for some
time now. Army conscripts, who
num bered 64,640 in 1983, were
down to just 13,000 by 1992. A
m em ber o f the arm y’s general staff
reported in 1993 a 12 percent
decline in the officer corps, and an
overall 32 percent reduction in army
units - including corps (40 p ercen t),
brigade com m ands (8.3 percent)
artillery com m ands (100 percent),
and logistical units (54 percent) - all
between 1983-1992. T he rep o rt
goes on to describe changes in the
organic structure of the army, the
m ovem ent of com bat brigades and
regim ents, and the redeploym ent of
troops, all allegedly guided by strate
gic logic to transform the army into
an organization that is “agile, versa
tile, flexible and courageous.”
While many of these changes have
actually occurred, it is dubious that
such transform ations have been
carefully orchestrated by strategic
design. W hat is m ore probable is
that the army, and the military in
general, have simply taken com pen
satory m easures to conform to a
budget which is 70 percent smaller
than it was a decade ago.
This kind o f knee-jerk downsizing
that responds to econom ic logic
w ithout sufficient regard for the
security needs o f the country has
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many Argentine defense specialists
concerned. Strategically-minded
structural reform is the solution, but
the military cannot or will not
reform itself. Unfortunately, clear
guidelines from the political authori
ties have n o t been forthcom ing. As
expected, years o f persistent budgetcutting without reform has set limits
on military tolerance. By 1993,
according to the Jo int Chiefs of Staff,
the military’s operating capacity was
at a m eager 20 percent (com pared
to 60 percent on the eve of the
Malvinas War) This alarm ing statis
tic ushered negotiations with
Defense Minister Oscar Camilion,
where Cavallo finally agreed to raise
the ceiling on military expenditures
with a 22 percent increase in supple
m ental funding for housing, cloth
ing and o ther personnel-related
items. Shortly thereafter, he
approved the procurem ent o f 36
U.S. skyhawk A-4M training planes
needed to replace roughly one-half
of the aircraft lost in the Malvinas
War.
A N e w C iv il-M ilita r y C u lt u r e
This agreem ent perhaps best typi
fies the new civil-military climate in
Argentina. Conflicts of interest and
perception am ong the arm ed ser
vices, the Ministry of Defense, and
the rest o f the governm ent persist,
but do not explode into full-scale
confrontation. Contacts are routinized, and problem s are solved
within the framework of institutions.
But m ore impressive than the rap
prochem ent between the military
and executive branch has been the
discovery o f com m on ground
between the military and civil society.
Before, each side rem ained incom
m unicado with the other, unable or
unwilling to break through the barri
ers of distrust. These days, not a
m onth goes by in Argentina without
contact between military and civilian
defense specialists. What began as a
single sociology sem inar on defense
issues held at the University of

Buenos Aires in 1984, has blossomed
into a near perm anent civil-military
dialogue made possible through the
creation of a host of organizations
dedicated to bringing together
experts from both sides. Military
and civilian research centers, com
missions with the Peronist and
Radical parties, and even the jo in t
military com m and itself have spon
sored initiatives to produce a cross
fertilization of opinions and ideas.
As a result, a small but viable
“defense establishm ent” not only
yields defense-related knowledge but
also perpetuates the new culture of
openness between soldiers and citi
zens.
This new culture is rem arkable in
light o f recent history. As a result of
the “Dirty War” and its acts o f terror,
the military thoroughly disgraced
and ostracized itself from the larger
Argentine community. But recently,
the arm ed forces have gone a long
way toward bridging the gulf that
separated it from society through
dem onstrations of remorse.
Revelations of misdeeds by under
lings have led senior com m anders to
acknowledge that their services com
m itted legally and morally unaccept
able acts. The army chief went fur
thest, stating that both those who
gave the orders and those who fol
lowed were responsible. In coming
to term s with its own disreputable
past, the military has helped rehabili
tate its standing. The Argentine
nation is the beneficiary.
C hallenges
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The first challenge is an institu
tional one. Unfortunately, the
Ministry of Defense still represents a
weak link in the chain of command.
U nder Menem, officials with no par
ticular background in defense have
been appointed temporarily for
political reasons, only to be with
drawn when convenient. Rapid per
sonnel turnover results in disconti
nuity, which in turn breeds unfamil
iarity and institutional m em ory fail

ure. T he pattern can only be broken
if the Menem governm ent and its
successors begin to acknowledge the
critical im portance of the defense
ministry in m aintaining good rela
tions with the arm ed forces.
The current lack of ministerial
continuity and expertise commonly
translates into lack of will, which
poses the next challenge to
Argentina, namely one o f leadership.
Until the president and his ministeri
al appointees step up to the plate to
establish clear defense and security
goals for the nation, further progress
is unlikely. The chief executive must
have defense vision, which the
defense minister and his staff can
then translate into concrete objec
tives, strategies and programs.
Indeed, the Law o f Defense requires
the m inister and his advisory council
to elaborate all hypotheses of con
flict and war, and to direct and coor
dinate all those defense activities not
already delegated to the president.
To date, the lack of presidential and
ministerial leadership has created a
vacuum which the arm ed services
themselves m ight be tem pted to fill.
Finally, Menem m ust avoid the
tem ptation to subordinate all
defense needs to econom ic criteria.
To date, he has deferred to
Domingo Cavallo, his economics
minister, who has held the defense
budget hostage to short-term fiscal
fluctuations. This prevents the ser
vices from undertaking reforms
based on long-term strategic fore
casting. Instead, according to the
director of Naval Program m ing and
Budgeting, they m ust now resort to
“situation planning” based on cur
rent budgetary realities. In the
future, there m ust be a balance
between economic and military
necessities, if the arm ed forces are to
thoroughly m odernize and profes
sionalize. Reason m ust prevail at the
political level as A rgentina advances
toward civilian control over the
arm ed forces and dem ocratic consol
idation. ■
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The Second Coming
Aldo C. Vacs

Partido Justicialista (Justice Party - PJ)
n July 8, 1995, Carlos
obtained a comfortable victory.
S. Menem began his
Menem gathered close to 50 percent
second term as presi
of the votes, making it unnecessary
dent of Argentina.
to organize a runoff presidential
Following in the foot
election. The PJ won most congres
steps of Juan
Domingo Peron, the foundersional
of theand gubernatorial races,
increased its majority in the
Peronist movem ent and the only
C ham ber of Deputies to 133 seats Argentine president elected to two
thereby securing its own quorum consecutive terms, Menem prom oted
and captured 10 of the 14 governor
a constitutional am endm ent allowing
ships in dispute. In contrast, the
his re-election and won an impressive
main opposition party, the Union
majority in the May 1995 electoral
Civica Radical (Radical Civic Union contest. U nder the term s of the
UCR) suffered a major defeat, gath
1994 constitutional reform, the presi
ering less than 17 percent of the
dential period was shortened from
votes, losing a num ber of congres
six to four years. M enem ’s presiden
sional seats, and winning in only four
cy will last until July 1999.
provinces. The runner-up in the
Unlike P eron’s attempt, the legality
elections was a new center-left coali
of the 1994 constitutional reform was
tion, the Frente del Pais Solidano
not disputed by the opposition. It
(Front for a Solidarity Country was generally accepted that M enem ’s
FREPASO), which obtained 29 per
victory had been secured observing
cent of the presidential votes and
all liberal democratic procedures.
elected 29 deputies, although it did
For the first time since 1930,
not win any governorship. O ther
Argentina com pleted m ore than one
smaller political groups and coali
decade of un in terru pted democracy
tions, with the exception of a few
in a political climate in which the
provincial parties with strong local
opposition endorsed the legitimacy
support, perform ed poorly and
of the elected authorities and the
failed to win any congressional seats.
military rem ained subordinated to
The May 1995 election ratified a
them. Constitutional guarantees and
majority of the electorate’s prefer
freedom s were respected, there was
ence for Menem and the PJ, who
lively political competition, and a
were perceived as the guarantors of
large majority of the population,
economic stability and social peace.
despite socioeconomic problems,
The results also confirmed the con
supported the preservation of the
tinuous electoral decline of the UCR,
democratic regime.
resulting partially from a collective
m em ory of hyperinflation, social tur
T h e I n it ia l C o n d it i o n s
moil and political instability that
The general elections o f May 1995
characterized Alfonsin’s final m onths
confirm ed Argentina’s changing
as president. Moreover, the UCR’s
political configuration. The ruling
poor perform ance resulted from
voter rejection of the agreem ent
reached between Alfonsin and
Aldo C. Vacs is associate professor of
Menem on the constitutional reform
government at Skidmore College.
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which had eroded the party’s image
as an opposition force.
The electoral em ergence of
FREPASO, a coalition of center-left
parties, is noteworthy for two rea
sons. First, it m arked the end of the
long period of Radical-Peronist bipar
tisan electoral predom inance.
Second, a significant portion of the
population, dissatisfied with M enem's
policies and practices, was looking
for new political alternatives that
prom ised less orthodox economic
programs, m ore progressive social
policies, and the elimination of gov
ernm ental corruption. FREPASO
filled that void.
In this context, Menem counted
on a num ber of positive factors to
secure the success of his second
administration. Politically, he relied
on his popularity, control of the PJ,
influence over a congressional major
ity and most provincial authorities,
and the relative weakness and divi
sions of the opposition. Economical
ly, there was substantial support for
the economic program im plem ented
since 1991 by Menem and his minis
ter of economy, Domingo Cavallo,
which elim inated inflation and
prom ised to generate renewed eco
nomic growth and modernization.
The administration also counted
on a favorable international climate
as relations with the United States,
Western Europe (including Great
Britain) and the rest of Latin
America rem ained friendly and coop
erative. Finally, the relative consoli
dation of the democratic regime,
dem onstrated by the absence o f any
military or civilian threats to political
stability, created an unprecedented
opportunity to complete the political
economic restructuring that Menem
had cham pioned since 1989 - the
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Fancy footwork keeps Carlos Menem alive

developm ent of a free m arket econo
my and the strengthening of liberal
democracy.
U
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The auspicious circumstances sur
rounding M enem ’s second coming
were soon affected by international
and domestic developments that test
ed the adm inistration’s com petence
and lessened its popularity. Since
early 1995, the Argentine economy
felt the reverberations of the
Mexican economic crisis - the socalled “Tequila Effect” - that led to
the outflow of capital, inability to
attract new financial flows, declining
reserves, plum m eting of the stock
market, rise o f interest rates and a
deepening recession. By May 1995,
the domestic situation deteriorated
as credit and consum ption fell,
unem ploym ent grew and fiscal crises
began to affect many of the provin
cial governments.
Paradoxically, this cridcal situation
enhanced M enem ’s electoral chances
as most voters trusted his and
Cavallo’s capacity to overcome the
difficulties. Based on the 1989
hyperinflationary experience, most
voters still questioned the Radicals’
economic aptitude and doubted that
a FREPASO administration would
have the necessary expertise.
At the time o f M enem ’s second
inauguration in July 1995, the
expected recovery had not material
ized and the socioeconomic crisis
had worsened. Unemploym ent
reached a record 18.6 percent, with
some o f the largest urban areas
going over 20 percent, while another
11.4 percent o f the economically
active population rem ained under
employed. Interest rates rem ained
very high, fluctuating between 16

percent and 23 percent. Consump
tion plum m eted, with sales declining
35 percent com pared to the first
semester of 1994 and commercial
bankruptcies escalating. Many
provincial administrations were
unable to pay salaries. Central Bank
reserves continued to decline while
the capital outflow persisted as more
than $8 billion in bank deposits fled
the country in the first half o f the
year. Economic projections anticipat
ed that the economy would contract
by 1 percent in 1995, and zero
growth could be expected in 1996.
Governm ent attem pts to deal with
the crisis by reducing employers’
social security contributions and
taxes on foreign investment, lowering
the banks’ reserve requirem ents,
increasing unem ploym ent subsidies
and coverage, and expanding some
social program s were not enough to
reverse the trend. The impact of
these measures was limited by
Cavallo’s decision to preserve the
convertibility program and not deval
uate the peso, maintain a fiscal sur
plus to pay the public debt, and his
refusal to transfer funds to the
provincial governments. As a result,
the expectations of economic recov
ery rem ained focused on the
prospects o f attracting new inflows of
capital, a possibility that did not
materialize as foreign investors
rem ained reluctant and A rgentina’s
international credit rating dropped.
The uncertainty concerning the
country’s economic prospects was
heightened by a num ber of provin
cial dem onstrations and riots involv
ing public employees who dem anded
payment and rejected cuts in their
salaries, strikes and dem onstrations
against unem ploym ent, and rum ors
of disagreements between Menem

and Cavallo that could lead to the latter’s resignation. The crisis became
m ore acute when the administra
tion’s internal disagreements led to
public attacks against Cavallo’s eco
nomic and social policies by other
members of the cabinet, Peronist leg
islators and ambassadors, and the
governor of Buenos Aires province
and M enem ’s expected political heir,
Eduardo Duhalde.
Cavallo reacted by denouncing the
involvement o f some of his critics in
governmental corruption and their
participation in organized “mafias”
which solicited kickbacks and bribes
and engaged in extortion, influence
peddling and money laundering.
Soon the antagonists becam e aware
of the potential political and eco
nomic costs associated with this strife
and tried to downplay the severity of
the accusations. Menem attem pted
to calm the situation, calling for a
truce and ratifying his confidence in
Cavallo and the economic plan. It
was too late, however, to contain the
negative fallout of the confrontation.
The afterm ath of the quarrel
included an intensification of the
adm inistration’s internal disputes,
growing concern with corruption, a
decline of public confidence in the
administration, and continuous
doubts on the part of foreign
investors and lenders about the sta
bility of Cavallo and his economic
program.
S etbacks

and

T e n s io n s

U nder these circumstances,
Menem lost some o f the support that
he had rallied at the time of his sec
ond inaugural. Public opinion polls
indicated that Cavallo’s image
improved as a result o f his attacks on
corruption - but Menem, his cabinet
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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and the Peronist party suffered a
significant decline in popularity.
T he political risks resulting from
this situation were com pounded by
the fact that a n um ber o f guberna
torial, ru n o ff and com plem entary
elections were scheduled before the
en d o f 1995.
In August, the gubernatorial elec
tions in the province o f Santa Fe
en d ed in a scandal as candidates of
different Peronist factions and the
opposition den o u n ced fraud and
called for a new vote. In Tierra del
Fuego and N euquen, provincial par
ties won the respective governor
ships. The PJ lost the m unicipal
elections in some o f the largest
urban centers, such as Rosario and
Cordoba, and in several smaller
provincial cities.
T he m ost severe setback occurred
in early O ctober 1995 in the senato
rial election held in the federal cap
ital and the ru n o ff gubernatorial
election in Chaco province. In the
federal district - the city o f Buenos
Aires - Graciela Fernandez Meijide,
the FREPASO candidate, leader of
the M others o f Plaza de Mayo and
hum an rights activist, won by a land
slide, carrying all the electoral
precincts. Second place was carried
by the UCR. T he Peronist candi
date, A ntonio E. Gonzalez, a form er
m inister of econom ics and defense
and close friend o f M enem, finished
a distant third. A lthough the
Peronist defeat was not a com plete
surprise due to the long history of
porteno support for opposition can
didates, m ost striking was the differ
ence in the nu m b er o f votes. Even
m ore om inous, from the adm inistra
tio n ’s perspective, was the defeat in
Chaco - the form er province of
President Peron and a traditional
stronghold o f Peronism - where a
Radical politician won the ru n o ff
vote against the PJ candidate. In
b oth cases, post-election polls indi
cated th at the crucial factors influ
encing voters was concern over cor
ru p tio n and unem ploym ent.
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While these negative political
developments unfolded, the Menem
adm inistration confronted growing
social unrest, particularly in the
provinces. In Cordoba, Jujuy,
Mendoza, Rio Negro, Salta and San
Juan, public employees, teachers and
other workers clashed with police as
dem onstrations called to resist salary
cuts, dismissals and paym ent delays
ended in riots. At the same time, the
pro-Menem General Confederation
of Labor dem anded solutions to the
unem ploym ent problem in an
attem pt to retain control over the
workers and contain the dem onstra
tions against the economic policies
organized by two labor confedera
tions that rem ained in the opposi
tion.
N

ew

C hallenges

C onfronted with these problems,
M enem attem pted to regain control
over the situation by minimizing
internal strife, distancing himself
from corruption, trying to reestab
lish foreign confidence in his adm in
istration, and making some conces
sions in term s of income and social
policies. After ordering his collabo
rators to cease their quarrels,
M enem blam ed the press for having
created a false image of dissension.
Meanwhile, some officials who were
accused of corruption - such as
those in the National Bank - were
dismissed and others - such as the
authorities o f the taxation agency
and the postal service - becam e the
target o f congressional and judicial
investigations.
In O ctober 1995, to regain foreign
economic confidence, M enem trav
elled to the U nited States, where he
assured business audiences that the
economic program would not be
m odified and that Cavallo would not
be replaced. Back hom e, in an
attem pt to defuse social tensions,
Menem also m et with labor represen
tatives, promising to preserve the
un io n ’s role in providing health ser
vices, to increase employer contribu

tions to the unions’ social service
programs, and to protect real wages.
Some o f these moves tend to con
tradict each other and may not help
to solve the problems. The confir
mation o f most appointed officials
makes it inevitable that internal dis
putes will once again arise and con
tinue to weaken the administration.
The dismissal of those involved in
blatant corruption and the investiga
tions underway could expose new
scandals and generate growing dis
trust am ong the public. The preser
vation of Cavallo and his policies
could deepen the recession and fur
ther discourage foreign capital from
returning to the country. The fulfill
m ent of the promises m ade to labor
groups may reduce profits and rein
force the reluctance of domestic and
foreign actors to expand their eco
nomic activities while perpetuating
the recession.
Nevertheless, it is im portant to
rem em ber that Menem has dem on
strated an uncanny ability to over
come political and socioeconomic
difficulties that would have ruined
other presidents’ popularity or even
caused their removal. The economic
em ergencies o f 1989 and 1991 were
successfully overcome; scandals such
as the laundering of drug money and
bribes dem anded from foreign com
panies by M enem ’s relatives and asso
ciates have been disregarded; politi
cal backlashes and electoral setbacks
have proved to be temporary, and
past social explosions have been con
tained. Thanks to a com bination of
political dexterity with a good dose
of fortune and opposition weakness
es, M enem was able to regain politi
cal control and return to center
stage in better condition than before.
Thus, if past experience is a reliable
indicator, the second M enem adm in
istration may repeat the pattern of
the first term . With economic and
social events often taking Menem to
the brink of a political abyss, he may
still come back strengthened in his
authority and popularity. ■
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Retratos de Mexico
Euclides Santiago

San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas

Euclides Santiago is a professional photographer who has worked extensively throughout Latin America.
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Journeys N orth
Clifford E. Griffin

tional opportunities and mobility,
interpersonal relationships, hous
ing, gender, and the im portance of
social networks.
Byron’s central argum ent is that
non-recruited m igration has evolved
into a m ajor survival strategy for
Pilgrims From the Sun: West
Caribbean individuals and families.
Indian Migration to America
This developm ent is the result o f a
By Ransford W. Palmer
“m igration ideology,” which is inher
New York: Twayne Publishers,
ited and p erpetuated by generations
1995, pp. 101
o f C aribbean people. This ideology
“comprises the goals and attitudes
towards m igration, which, often
hese books continue
the exploration of
unconsciously as far as the migrants
Caribbean m igration
are concerned, assist the sm ooth
flow of a supply o f labor to indus
and offer insights into
tries in the core countries.” Byron
this p h enom enon by
dem onstrates this “m igration ideolo
focusing respectively on
gy” by drawing upon 1987 survey
the post-war m igration of Caribbean
data o f Nevisian schoolchildren
nationals to the U nited Kingdom
ranging in age from 11 to 19 years
and to the U nited States.
old. O ne conclusion drawn from
Post-war Caribbean Migration to
Britain analyzes the origins, motiva
the overall survey is that m igration
tions, strategies, and levels o f suc
is both glam orized and institutional
cess o f a special category of
ized as a survival and advancem ent
m igrants - non-recruited labor
option and, therefore, produces a
m igrants - from the island of Nevis,
“laten t” supply o f m igrant labor for
who em igrated to Britain during the
richer countries.
Given this propensity to m igrate,
post-war years. T he study is rich in
which is a product o f C aribbean his
anecdotes from interviews with a
tory, several propositions are
nu m b er o f these migrants, which
advanced to explain some of the
provide many insights into the
dynamics o f non-recruited m igra
m igration ordeal. Many readers
tion. First, social networks are
would recognize th at these experi
essential structures in facilitating
ences are not specific to Nevisian
m igrants b u t reflect those of
the process o f non-recruited m igra
tion. Second, these networks repro
Jam aicans, St. Lucians, and other
duce exploitation o f m igrants by
C aribbean sojourners as well. These
avoiding or m inim izing the provi
insights are obtained through an
sion of essential services for the
analysis o f issues including occupamigrants. Third, m igrants are
unlikely to achieve their desired
Clifford E. Griffin is assistant professor
goals due to constraints im posed
upon them by the system and the
of political science and public adminis
contexts in which they live in
tration at North Carolina State
Britain.
University.
Post-War Caribbean Migration to
Britain: The Unfinished Cycle
By Margaret Byron
Aldershot, England: Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd., 1994, pp. 221.
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The centrality of social networks is
aptly dem onstrated in this analysis.
Essentially, social networks act as an
organizing force in facilitating
non-recruited m igration and
m igrants’ goals in the face o f restric
tive structures. Such u n d erem p h a
sis has created a distorted picture of
C aribbean m igrants as a disorga
nized and disunited group. This
book counters that perspective.
Finally, in addressing the prob
lematic subject of retu rn m igration,
Byron analyzes several variables that
influence the decision to retu rn
hom e. They include the im por
tance o f the retu rn elem ent in the
m igrant calculus, conditions u n d er
which re tu rn m igration is likely,
conditions and factors likely to pre
vent return, and the effect on local
economic, family and cultural sys
tems o f the retu rn movement.
Post-War Caribbean Migration to
Britain goes beyond George
Gm elch's Double Passage: The Lives of
Caribbean Migrants Abroad and Back
Home (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1992), by anchoring
itself in a strong theoretical fram e
work and providing fresh insights
into the study of Caribbean m igra
tion.
Pilgrims From the Sun, which is
m uch broader in scope, attem pts to
explain a second wave of m igration,
that o f large num bers o f people
from the A nglophone C aribbean to
the U nited States. The period of
analysis begins during the early
1960s in the wake o f two events: the
im plem entation of B ritain’s new
and highly restrictive im m igration
policy and the m ovem ent toward
independence by then British
colonies. C oincident with these
events was the econom ic boom in

F

the U nited Sates and a liberalization
o f U.S. im m igration laws in 1965.
This largely econom ic analysis
assesses some o f the collateral
impacts of m igration on both the
sending countries and the U nited
States, in general, and Kings County
(Brooklyn) in the state of New York
in particular. T he central proposi
tion is that C aribbean m igration to
the U nited States is driven primarily
by economics, and that accelerated
growth is the antidote to this
propensity to migrate.
Palm er advances two general
argum ents. First, m igration has
benefitted the U nited States m uch
m ore than the sending countries,
largely because of the resulting
brain drain. T he p oint seems
rath er obvious since existing theo
ries co n ten d that highly skilled,
gainfully em ployed individuals are
highly likely to m igrate. Earnings at
hom e enable them to set aside
enough m oney to m eet the chal
lenge o f resettling and securing
em ploym ent in the host country.
Palm er shows the extent to which
governm ents in the A nglophone
Caribbean indeed have subsidized
econom ic developm ent in the
U nited States by providing a con
stant supply o f highly trained per
sonnel such as doctors and nurses.
The U nited States siphons off these
skills by wage inducem ents and by
providing those trained in the U.S.
with the chance for perm an en t resi
dency. U.S. im m igration policy of
reuniting families is also a factor.
Palm er views this pattern of
m igration as essentially the result of
“push-pull” econom ic factors, and
attributes little, if any, to other
“p u sh ” factors such as politics.
Politics precipitated increased em i
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gration from Guyana during the
B urnham era; from Trinidad and
Tobago following the Black Power
Riots in 1970; from Jam aica in the
1970s during Michael Manley’s first
tenure; from G renada toward the
en d o f the Gairy period; and also
from G renada during the rule of
the P eople’s Revolutionary
Governm ent. Moreover, a signifi
cant nu m b er o f m igrants are highly
skilled/educated people and often
form idable political opponents in
several countries where their
involvement in politics often leads
to politically volatility. Thus, immi
gration contributes to political sta
bility by providing an escape valve
for political discontents.
Second, Palm er contends that
m igrants from the A nglophone
C aribbean and their offspring who
are born in the U.S. have been
m ore successful at realizing the
American dream - at least econom i
cally and educationally - than have
African-Americans. Unfortunately,
no comparative data on num bers of
college graduates or any such indi
cators are provided to substantiate
this claim. Afro-Caribbeans, howev
er, have not been as successful as
African-Americans in translating
their econom ic and educational suc
cesses into political power. For
example, the ratio o f CaribbeanAm ericans to African-Americans in
political office (city, county, state,
and federal governm ent) is quite
small.
T he danger o f Palm er’s argum ent
is that it supports those who wish to
keep the black com m unity divided
and powerless. Such people claim
that African-Americans are lazy and
shiftless, and are wedded to welfare.
Palm er facilitates this by arguing
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that “the majority o f the West
Indians in Brooklyn live in black
enclaves and rarely interact social
ly with the white population...
have m aintained an ethnic identi
ty separate from the rest o f the
black population... beyond the
work place, they strive to m aintain
their West Indianness and th ere
fore their separate cultural identi
ty” (p.20). But, continues Palmer,
“while West Indians strive to m ain
tain their ethnic and cultural
identity in America, their socioe
conom ic success depends on the
larger black populatio n ” (p.21).
Clearly, the presence o f such an
hom ogenized com m unity p ro
vides the researcher with the
opportunity to collect quantitative
and qualitative data ab out the
experiences o f these migrants.
Thus, while Pilgrims From the Sun
is timely, it appears to have bitten
off m ore than it can chew. It is
no t g rounded in any coherent
theoretical framework. T he read
er is given no overall statem ent of
purpose and methodology; nei
th er is the reader given any
insights into why this is an im por
tant and instructive study. The
study tries too hard to “prove” the
econom ic linkage between migra
tion decisions and econom ic
grow th/developm ent in the
A nglophone C aribbean and
understates the im portance of
o ther contributory factors. These
include political factors as well as
what could be described as a nat
ural propensity am ong people
from the C aribbean to m igrate.
Caribbean people m igrate
because it is the thing to do. At
the same time, while issues such
as recruited, un recru ited and illeHemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
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gal migrants; the role o f rem it
tances; the relationship between
m igration, em ploym ent, occupa
tion, and trade; and “counterm igra
tio n ” are addressed, they are only
glossed over in this 101-page vol
ume.
T he au th o r commits the fallacy of
the single cause by attem pting to
extrapolate from the single case
results o f his study. According to
Palmer, “because Jam aica has the
largest population o f all the
English-speaking Caribbean coun
tries, it is used to illustrate the eco
nom ic im pact o f the closing and
o p ening of the population escape
valve” (p. 14). Geography and pop
ulation size are n o t sufficient to
explain the econom ic im pact o f
m igration policy. Economic
b ase/stru ctu re is a critical factor.
T rinidad and Tobago, for example,
has always had a m ore diversified
and robust econom y than Jam aica,
and m ore m igration alternatives
because o f this and close geographi
cal and cultural connections with
the South Am erican m ainland.
Finally, no m ention is m ade of the
U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico,
the destinations o f many migrants
from eastern C aribbean islands such
as Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St.
Lucia.
Palm er claims th at “a plausible
argum ent can also be m ade that
m igration, especially the m igration
of skilled people, accelerated the
econom ic decline o f Jam aica by
depriving the productive units of
the econom y o f productive skills.
This led to the underutilization of
plant capacity... As a consequence,
the productive base o f the economy
shrunk... the tax base also sh ru n k .”
T he question is, what caused this
em igration o f skills? M anley’s
dem ocratic socialist policies
angered the U nited States, which
pressured the International
M onetary Fund to w ithhold loans to
the governm ent of Jam aica. At the
same time, not only did B urnham ’s
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m isguided policies and his choice
o f a cooperative socialist path to
developm ent contribute to prob
lems in Guyana, m ajor W estern
countries did n o t em brace him
either. H ence, it is simplistic to
attribute Jam aica’s (and the
A nglophone C aribbean’s) econom 
ic decline to em igration, rather
than see em igration as a rational
response to external forces as well
as dom estic politics.
In describing the political behav
ior o f C aribbean nationals in
H artford, C onnecticut, Palm er pre
sents the following argum ent,
which represents a huge leap of
logic: “T he hard work and earnest
ness that have shaped their eco
nom ic success have also shaped the
political orientation o f their lead
ers. T he only West Indian to be

elected to the H artfo rd City
Council, Colin B ennett, ran as a
R epublican and was elected four
times. A nd the president o f the
H artford chapter o f the Jam aica
Progressive League... is also a
R epublican. T here appears to be a
right o f center drift in the politics
of this m iddle class com m unity.”
The au th o r provides no data to
show the political orientation of
this C aribbean community. N either
is there any evidence th at the
C aribbean com m unity voted for
B ennett. Even if they did, did they
vote for him because they, like him,
are Republicans, o r simply because
he is from the Caribbean? In sum,
Pilgrims From the Sun does n o t offer
any new perspectives on this im por
tant aspect o f the C aribbean
reality. ■
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T hrough the Lens
M arian Goslinga

h o to g rap h ic archives
an d collections consti
tu te im p o rtan t legacies
and have increasingly
becom e a focal point
for research.
Photography, as a discipline by
itself, has also attain ed a
respectable standing and, in recen t
years, has drawn m any ad h eren ts
to its cause. In 1992, Edward
R anney p u b lish ed a survey of
re cen t photo b o o k s specifically
dealing with Latin A m erica in
which he sum m arized the existing
literatu re on b o th aspects o f the
subject (Latin American Research
Review, v. 26, no. 3, Sum m er 1991,
pp. 235-246). R anney’s work was
b ro u g h t up to date by Wendy
Watriss an d Lois Zam ora (eds.) in
th eir Image and Memory: Latin
American Photography, 1865-1992,
pu b lish ed by Rice University Press
(H ouston, Texas) in 1994. This
bibliography will start w here
Ranney, Watriss an d Zam ora left
off, listing m aterials published
within th e last th ree years - 1993
to mid-1995. In clu d ed will be
item s covering th e entire region,
individual co untries - M exico p ro 
viding th e m ost en tries - as well as
works on individual p h o to g rap h ers
(i.e. G uillerm o Kahlo, M ariana
Yampolsky, M anuel Alvarez Bravo,
G raciela Iturb id e, Flor G arduno,
etc.). It is notew orthy th at am ong
the leading Latin A m erican p h o 
to g rap h ers o f today, wom en make
up the majority.

P

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American
and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
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A ciento cincuenta arios de la
fotografia. Felicitas Luna, ed. Todo
es Historia, vol. 27, no. 313 (August
1993), pp. 92. [Proceedings o f the
second Congreso de la Fotografia
A rgentina, 1839-1939.]
Album de familia. Myriam Lins de
Barros, liana Strozenberg. Rio de
Janeiro: Com unicacao
C ontem poranea; 1993. 123 pp.
[Collection of family portraits from
Brazil.]

Humero, no. 29 (May 1993), pp. 144173.
The Chiapa Photography Project:
Photos from Sister Carlota Duarte’s
Book Odella, A Hidden Survivor.
America, vol. 171, no. 20 (Decem ber
31, 1994), pp. 22-24.
Cuban Photography: Context and
Meaning. Jo h n Mraz. History of
Photography, vol. 18 (Spring 1994),
pp. 87-96.

Alexandra Edwards. Ilona Katzew.
Review, no. 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 8284. [Recent work from the Chilean
photographer.]

Desires and Disguises: Five Latin
American Photographers. A m anda
H opkinson, ed. and trans. London:
S erpent’s Tail; 1994. 80 pp.

Ambra Polidor. Mary Schneider
Enriquez. Art News (Special issue
1995), pp. 147. [Works by the con
tem porary Mexican photographer]

Early Twentieth Century Peruvian
Photography. Cheryl H artup. Latin
American Art, vol. 5, no. 2 (Sum m er
1993), pp. 60-62.

American voices: Cuban, Chicano
and Puerto Rican Photographers in
FotoFest ‘94. F ernando Castro. Art
Nexus, no. 16 (A p ril-Ju n e 1995),
pp. 70-74. [Photographs from an
exhibition held in H ouston, Texas.]

Eugenia Vargas: el proscenio
inevitable. R oberto Tejada, Paloma
Diaz Abreu. Artes de Mexico, no. 21
(Fall 1993), pp. 98-99. [Eugenia
Vargas is a Mexican photographer.]

Argentina: The Great Estancias.
Ju an Pablo Queiroz, Tomas de Elia,
eds; Tomas de Elia, Cristina
Cassinelli de Corral, photographers.
New York, NY: Rizzoli; 1995.
[Mostly photographs.]
Arquitectura de Mexico: fotografias
de Juan Rulfo. Mexico, DF:
Consejo Nacional para la C ultura y
las Artes; 1994. 24 pp.
Avatares de la obra del fotografo
peruano Martin Chambi (18911973) y resena de dos monografias
recientes. Jorge H eredia. Hueso

Una experiencia de investigacion en
acervos fotograficos del siglo XIX.
Patricia Masse Zendejas. La Palabra
y el Hombre, no. 97 (July-September
1993), pp. 117-126. [This article
discusses research m ethods in
Mexican photographic archives.]
The Exposure o f Light and Line:
Photographs by Valdir Cruz.
Edward Leffmgwell. Americas, vol.
46, no. 2 (March-April 1994), pp.
48-53. [Valdir Cruz is a Brazilian
photographer.]
Flor Garduno: Witnesses o f the
Same Dream. F ernando Castro. Art

N

Nexus, no. 11 (January-March 1994),
pp. 219-222. [Flor G arduno is an
award-winning ph otogapher from
Mexico whose works are perm an en t
ly displayed in Paris and Mexico
City.]
Fotografia ilimitada e inalcanzable.
Nelson H errera Ysla. Casa de las
Americas, n. 193 (October-Novem ber
1993), pp. 100-110. [General dis
cussion o f Latin Am erican photog
raphy.]
A fotografia no Brasil do seculo
XIX: 150 aiios de fotografo Marc
Ferrez, 1843-1993. Pedro Vasquez,
Gilberto Ferrez, ed. Sao Paulo:
1993. 63 pp.
Fotografia: la memoria cuestionada.
Sara Facio. Cuadernos
Hispanoamericanos, no. 517-519 (JulySeptem ber 1993), pp. 269-279.
[Focuses on Argentina.]

U

D

1975) was a nationalized Mexican
citizen who has becom e well known
as a photographer and art collector.]
Fuga mexicana: un recorrido por la
fotografia en Mexico. Olivier
Debroise, Elizabeth Fuentes Rojas.
Mexico, DF: Consejo Nacional para
la Cultura y las Artes; 1994. 223 pp.
Garciela Iturbide: fotografias.
Mexico, DF: FotoSeptiem bre; 1993.
1 vol. (unpaged). [Photographs
from an exhibition held SeptemberO ctober 1993 at the Palacio de
Bellas Artes, Mexico City.]
Guillermo Kahlo: vida y obra - foto
grafo, 1872-1941. Mexico, DF:
Consejo Nacional para la C ultura y
las Artes, Instituto Nacional de
Bellas Artes; 1993. 197 pp.
[Photographs from exhibitions held
in 1993 at the Museo Estudio Diego
Rivero and the Museo Nacional de
A rquitectura in Mexico City.]

Las fotografias de Alicia D’Amico:
cambiando las reglas del juego.
Ester G im bernat de Gonzalez.
Confluencia, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring
1994), pp. 3-4. [Analyzes the work
o f the A rgentine photographer.]

Haitian Studio Photography: A hid
den World o f Images. Marilyn
H oulbert. Aperture, n. 126 (W inter
1992), pp. 58-65.

Fotografias para la historia de
Puerto Rico, 1844-1952. Osvaldo
Garcia. 2a ed. Rio Piedras, PR.:
Ediciones H uracan; 1993. 397 pp.

Imagens e memorias, 1920-1930:
italianos do Brasil. Suzana B arretto
Ribeiro. Sao Paulo: Editora
Brasiliense; 1994. 162 pp.
[Photographs of Italian im m igrants
in Sao Paolo, Brazil.]

Fotos mexicanas en la Casa de las
Culturas. A nnette Zinkant, Jose
Luis Gomez y Patino, trans.
Humboldt, no. 109 (1993), pp. 96.
Franz Mayer fotografo. Jose
Antonio Rodriguez, Erika Billeter.
Mexico, DF: Museo Franz Mayer;
1995. 83 pp. [Franz Mayer (1882-

James Key: en busca del placer de la
luz. Ferm ln Ramirez. Plural
(Mexico), vol. 23, no. 279
(D ecem ber 1994), pp. 40-47.
Juan Rodrigo Llaguno: retratos.
Monterrey, Mex.: Museo de
M onterrey; 1993. 31 leaves.

A

Juan Rulfo, photographe: esthetique
du royaume des ames. Beatrice
Tatard. Paris: L’H arm attan; 1994.
172 pp.
Life and Still-Lifes: Ramon
Guerrero. Lynette M.F. Bosch.
Latin American Art, vol. 5 n. 4
(1994), pp. 57-61. [Works by the
Hispanic-American photo g rap h er
who died in 1994.]
Lola Alvarez Bravo: fotografias
selectas, 1934-1985. Lucia GarclaNoriega y Nieto et al., eds. Mexico,
DF: C entro C ultural/A rte
C ontem poraneo; 1993. 449 pp.
[A selection o f works from the
Mexican p h otograph er (19071993).]
Lola Alvarez Bravo: la luz en el
espejo. Sergio Gonzalez Rodriguez.
Nexos, vol. 16, no. 190 (O ctober
1993), pp. 16-20.
Lourdes Almeida y el mito como
escritura fotografica. Jose A ntonio
Rodriguez. Artes de Mexico, no. 22
(W inter 1993-1994), pp. 109-111.
Luis Gonzalez Palma: los iluminados. F ernando Castro. Art Nexus,
no. 7 (January-March 1993), pp.
136-138. [Gonzalez Palma is a pho
tographer from Guatemala.]
Manos poderosas: The Photography
o f Graciela Ituribide. Elizabeth
Ferrer. Review, no. 47 (Fall 1993),
pp. 69-78.
Marcos Lopez: fotografias. Sara
Facio, ed. Buenos Aires: Azotea
Editorial Fotografica; 1993. 75 pp.
[Portraits by the A rgentine photog
rapher.]
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Nuevo espacio de la fotografia: cen
tra de la imagen. Leon or Lara de la
Fuente. Artes de Mexico, no. 26
(Septem ber-O ctober 1994), pp. 8687.
Nuevo Leon: el paisaje y su espejo.
A braham Nuncio, ed. Monterrey,
Mex.: G obierno del Estado de
Nuevo Leon, C oordinacion de
Publicaciones y Proyectos
Especiales; 199S. 153 p. [Catalog
of recent photographs and paint
ings.]

tion held November 22, 1993January 23, 1994 at the Museo de
Artes Visuales A lejandro O tero,
Caracas.]

1993), pp. 74-78. [About
A rgentina.]
Tina Modotti: A Fragile Life.
M ildred Constantine. New ed. San
Francisco, CA: C hronicle Books;
1993. 194 pp. [Biography o f the
Mexican p h o tographer (18961942).]

Sexto Bienal de Fotografia: Centro
de la Imagen, abril-mayo, 1994,
Plaza de la Ciudadela, Mexico.
Mexico DF: Consejo Nacional para
la Cultura y las Artes, Instituto
Nacional de Bellas Artes; 1994. 300
pp.

El ojo de vidrio: cien anos de
fotografia del Mexico indio. Jaime
Velez Storey et al, eds. Mexico, DF:
Banco de Mexico; 1993. 191 p.

A Shadow Born o f Earth: New
Photography in Mexico. Elizabeth
Ferrer. New York, NY: Am erican
Federation o f Arts in association
with Universe Publishing; 1993. 143
pp.

Los ojos de la luna. Victor Flores
Olea. Mexico, DF: Miguel Angel
P orrua G rupo Editorial; 1994. 81
pp. [Mexico City in photgraphs.]

Los sortilegios de la mirada: la
fotografia de Mariana Yampolsky.
Majorie Agosin. Fem, vol. 18, no.
136 (June 1994), pp. 42-45.

Over 70 Years o f Photography in
Mexico. Business Mexico, vol. 4, no.
4 (April 1994), pp. 37.

Tecnicas y trucos de nuestros fotografos. Federico B. Kirbus. Todo es
Historia, vol. 26, no. 309 (April

Retratos de familia: Leitura de
fotografia historica. Miriam
M oreira Leite. Sao Paulo: Editora
de Universidade de Sao Paulo; 1993.
192 pp. [Collection o f family pho
tographs from Brazil.]
Revelations. Carlos Jim enez. Art
Nexus, no. 15 (January-March 1995),
pp. 116-117. [Exhibition of
Colom bian photographs held at the
La Tertulia Museum, Cali.]
Rogelio Cuellar: el sentido de una
mirada. Jose M anuel Springer.
Artes de Mexico, no. 22 (W inter 19931994), pp. 112-113. [Cuellar is a
Mexican photogrpaher.]

Tina Modotti: Photographs. Sarah
M. Lowe, ed. New York, NY: H.N.
Abrams in association with the
Philadelphia M useum o f Art; 1995.
160 pp.
Veinte fotografos del siglo XIX.
Am paro Gomez Tepexicuapan.
Mexico, DF: Instituto Nacional de
A ntropologia e Historia; 1994. 59
pp. [Selections from the exhibition
FotoSeptiem bre 1994.]
Yesterday’s Modern Images, Today’s
Archival Treasures. Daniel Buck.
Americas, vol. 46, no. 5 (SeptemberO ctober 1994), pp. 21-27. [19thcentury Bolivian photography.] ■
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Romper los margenes. Encuentro
de Fotografia Latinoam ericana
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